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Is New London the Key to World Patent 
Harmony? 
Max Stul Oppenheimer* 
ABSTRACT 
Since 1790, when two U.S. patent applicants have claimed 
the same invention, the patent has been awarded to the first 
inventor. Today, the United States stands alone in the 
industrialized world, and many argue that the United States 
should, in the interest of world patent harmony, change its 
system so as to award a contested patent to the first applicant. 
Of the arguments advanced to justify the change, the only ones 
that withstand scrutiny are that "all the other countries are 
doing it" and the hope that some concessions in other aspects of 
intellectual property or trade might be obtained in exchange. 
There are compelling reasons to resist the change, principally 
that (unless other fundamental aspects of U.S. patent law are 
changed as well) U.S. inventors will be disadvantaged. 
Even if the arguments favoring the change are found to 
outweigh the arguments favoring the status quo, the power to 
grant U.S. patents derives from Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 
(the Intellectual Property Clause) of the Constitution, which 
authorizes granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors. 
Other countries are not so constrained. An historical analysis of 
the Intellectual Property Clause and review of the types of 
evidence used by the Supreme Court in constitutional analysis 
lead to the conclusion that the Intellectual Property Clause does 
not permit granting patents to the first applicant in preference 
to the first inventor. 
Alternate sources of Congressional power have been 
suggested (principally the Commerce Clause and the Treaty 
Power), but the Supreme Court has never found either sufficient 
to overcome a specific constitutional limitation of power. The 
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only power which seems sufficient to accomplish the objective of 
harmonization within constitutional limits is eminent domain. 
I. 
II. 
III. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
THE PROPOSAL TO HARMONIZE PATENT LAWS ............ . 
A. Patent Theory and the First-to-File 
Movement ........................................................... . 
B. Early History and Overview of Current 
U.S. Patent Priority Law ................................... . 
C. Overview of Non-U.S. Patent Priority Law ...... . 
D. The Economic and Political Arguments 
Regarding First-to-File ...................................... . 
1. Arguments for Change ............................. . 
2. Arguments for the Status Quo ................. . 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM .................................. . 
A. Article I, Section Eight: History and 
Interpretation ..................................................... . 
1. Pre-Constitutional History ....................... . 
2. The Drafting Debates, Ratification 
Debates, and Early Public Reactions ....... . 
3. Early Judicial Precedent .......................... . 
4. Early Congressional Precedent ................ . 
B. Does Article L Section 8 Constrain Patent 
Enactments? ....................................................... . 
1. Is the Preamble a Limitation? ................. . 
2. Does Article I Limit Patents to the 
447 
447 
457 
460 
462 
463 
468 
470 
470 
472 
473 
476 
477 
479 
479 
First-to-Invent?.......................................... 480 
C. Can Congress Overcome Section Eight 
Limitations Through Other Clauses? ............... . 
1. Can the Commerce Clause Overcome 
Section Eight Limitations? ....................... . 
2. Can the Treaty Power Overcome 
Section Eight Limitations? ....................... . 
D. The Exclusivity Problem .................................... . 
E. The Constitutionality of First-to-File ................ . 
CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS ....................................... . 
A. Eminent Domain and its Applicability to 
Patents ................................................................ . 
B. The Challenges of Public Use and Just 
Compensation .................................................... . 
C. Reconciling Condemnation with 
Harmonization ................................................... . 
481 
482 
483 
488 
488 
488 
489 
495 
500 
2007] HARMONIZATION THROUGH CONDEMNATION 447 
I. THE PROPOSAL TO HARMONIZE PATENT LAWS 
Harmonization is usually good1 if the result is that everyone does 
things your way. Harmonization is more complicated if it requires 
conforming behavior to someone else's norms. This latter case 
requires two analyses: one of the costs and benefits of the proposed 
change, and one of whether the proposed change violates some 
fundamental principle that overrides an otherwise favorable 
cost/benefit analysis. A recurrent proposal to harmonize world patent 
laws presents both questions for the United States. 
A. Patent Theory and the First-to-File Movement 
Patents are limited monopolies granted by most countries to 
encourage innovation.2 In the United States, patents are contrary to 
general principles favoring competition and therefore are granted 
only if they meet statutory requirements designed to assure that the 
public receives a valuable contribution in return: 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither 
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private 
benefit .... [They are] intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors ... and to allow the public access to the products 
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired. 3 
Once such access has been achieved through one disclosure, there is 
no need to provide incentives for a second disclosure.4 Although the 
Constitution does not explicitly limit the grant to one patent per 
1. While it is tempting to assume that harmonization is good per se, it is easy 
to cite cases where it is not; in 1789, harmonization might have led the Constitutional 
Convention to choose monarchy. 
2. In the United States, the justification for granting patents (as well as 
copyrights) is found in Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eight of the Constitution, which 
provides "Congress shall have Power ... to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
3. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). While Sony 
involved alleged infringement of copyrights, the copyright and patent laws find 
authority in the same clause of the Constitution and the Sony analysis borrows heavily 
from patent law. 
4. For example, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a "trade secret" as: 
[I]nformation . . . that: (i) Derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use; and (ii) Is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985). Publication of a patent would destroy any trade 
secret contained in the specification by making it generally known; allowing 
publication would also destroy the trade secret as a failure to make reasonable efforts 
to maintain its secrecy. 
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invention, the Supreme Court has held that a patent may not 
withdraw technology from the public domain.5 It follows that in the 
United States it would be unconstitutional (and even absent the 
constitutional constraint, undesirable) to grant more than one patent 
per invention. 6 
In the great majority of U.S. cases, this principle of no more than 
one patent per invention is applied in the context of deciding 
patentability. If the claimed invention already appears in the prior 
art, 7 or is an obvious extension of the prior art, 8 there is no need to 
grant the patent because the public already has access to the 
5. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989), held that 
Congress cannot remove information from the public domain because removal would 
thwart the constitutional mandate to promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts. 
There is no public domain clause in the Copyright Clause, and absent the 
requirement that patents "promote the Progress of ... useful Arts," there is no 
textual reason why Congress today could not grant a patent to an Inventor for 
his "Discovery" just because that discovery has already passed into the public 
domain .... Yet as this Court has held, in light of the "limitations" built into 
the clause, "monopolies" are not permitted under the Copyright Clause when 
there is no "concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 
Br. for Pet'r at 21, Eldred v. Reno, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (quoting Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 
at 146). 
6. There are circumstances in which no patent would be available for an 
invention such as if the invention were not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2006); if the invention were already in the public domain but unpatented 
(prohibited in the U.S. by 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03); or if the applicant violated a rule (35 
U.S. C. §§ 101-03). In the United States, examples of violating a rule would include 
creating a statutory bar by publishing an enabling description or offering an 
embodiment of the invention for sale more than a year prior to filing an application (35 
U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 103); failing to respond to an office action within the permitted time 
(35 U.S. C. § 133); or failing to disclose relevant information during prosecution of the 
application (Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949)). 
7. "Prior art" refers to information which is relevant to a determination of 
patentability. If the technology claimed in a patent application is already in the prior 
art, the application would fail under both 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter ... may obtain a patent therefor") and 35 U.S.C. § 102 ("A person shall be 
entitled to a patent unless-(a) the invention was known or used by others in this 
country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, 
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the invention was 
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public 
use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application 
for patent in the United States .... "). 
8. 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed 
or described as set forth in section 102 ... if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter 
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
35 U.S.C. 103(a). 
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information. Occasionally, however, there are circumstances in 
which the claimed invention is not in the prior art, but there are 
multiple claimants to the patent. 9 For example, if the prior art is 
interpreted to include only the domestic technology base, then a 
traveler who observes someone else's invention in a foreign country 
and is the first to bring news of the invention back home would be 
adding to the technology base. If several travelers each brought the 
same technology home, it would be logical and fair to award a patent 
to the first to file an application. 10 In this case, the contribution to 
the public is not the invention of the technology but its local 
dissemination. If the actual (foreign) inventor were then to travel to 
the domestic country and file a patent application, a different 
problem would arise: there would be a conflict between the first filer 
and the true inventor. Early patent systems and cases must be 
viewed in the context of the communications and transportation 
systems of the times, and care must be taken in applying them to 
modern day circumstances.11 
Derivation is another circumstance in which there might be 
multiple claimants. The true inventor might choose not to file a 
patent application. 12 Another individual might learn of the invention 
from the actual inventor and file a patent application. If the true 
9. The most recent available U.S. Patent Office statistics (for 2001) indicate 
that less than 0.05% of patent applications involve multiple claimants to the same 
invention. See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Patent Statistics Report, 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taflreports_stco.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). 
In that year there were 345,732 applications and about 136 interferences were 
declared between applications claiming the same invention. Id. Interferences are 
reported on a fiscal year basis: there were 136 in fiscal 2000 and 124 in fiscal 2001. Id. 
It may be objected that it takes time for an interference to be declared, so the 
comparison should be between 2001 interferences and an earlier year's applications. 
Even going back to 1998, the incidence would still be only slightly above 0.05% 
(260,889 applications). Id. 
10. A patent granted to one who observes the technology abroad but is the first 
to introduce it domestically is referred to as a patent of importation. While recognized 
in seventeenth century England, they were rejected in early U.S. decisions. See, e.g., 
Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804); Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 
491 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). 
11. For good reason, most eighteenth century systems followed the rule of 
considering only the domestic technology base. Before rapid communications, the 
internet, and common international travel, it was likely that technology from other 
countries would elude the domestic technology base. There may well be advanced 
technology on other planets, but it is not considered prior art under U.S. (or any other) 
patent law. If, in the future, it becomes common to communicate with or travel to 
extraterrestrial civilizations, their technology would become part of the prior art under 
current statutes as written. 
12. There are many reasons an inventor might make this choice, including 
ignorance of the patent system, lack of funds, failure to appreciate the true value of the 
invention, or a conscious decision to forego patent protection (which only lasts a 
maximum of twenty years) to maintain trade secret protection (which in theory could 
last forever). 
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inventor then filed a patent application, a conflict similar to the 
"patent of importation" scenario arises. However, here the result 
might logically depend on the motives of the "true" inventor. Sound 
policy might deny a government-sanctioned monopoly to a true 
inventor who had no intention of placing the technology in the public 
domain until after someone else had done so.13 
The final scenario in which there might be multiple claimants to 
a patent on the same invention is multiple independent invention by 
individuals who, unaware of the others' work, independently make 
the same invention. Here, each might be considered an "inventor" in 
the sense that the technological advance was made in ignorance of its 
previous discovery by another "inventor." To maintain the principle 
that only one patent may be granted for each invention, a choice must 
be made between individuals, each of whom is acting in good faith 
and following exactly the path the patent system wants: filing a 
patent application and surrendering a trade secret. 
It is this last scenario that poses the problem for those who seek 
international harmonization of patent laws. Two systems would 
logically further the goal of granting only one patent per invention: a 
first-to-invent system of awarding patents to the first inventor, 
thereby rewarding innovation, or a first-to-file system awarding 
. patents to the first person to disclose the invention to the government 
by filing a patent application, thereby rewarding promptly putting 
the invention in the domain of public knowledge. 14 In the vast 
majority of cases, the choice of system does not matter; it is rare for a 
subsequent applicant to challenge the right of the first applicant to 
the patent.l5 The United States has always had a first-to-invent 
13. The U.S. patent system has two checks on the inventor who does not file a 
patent application promptly: the statutory bars (see discussion infra note 120) and the 
requirement that an inventor not have "suppressed or concealed" the invention (see 
discussion infra note 87). 
14. There are other theoretical solutions which are not under consideration for 
the international standard. One would be to deny a patent to anyone if there were 
multiple claimants. There is one case in the United States presenting the rare case in 
which two applicants claimed the same invention and both had the identical filing date 
and the identical date of constructive reduction to practice; the Board of Patent 
Appeals denied priority to both applicants. Lassman v. Brossi Gerecke & Kyburz, 159 
U.S.P.Q. 182 (Pat. Off. Bd. of Pat. Interferences 1967). Another theoretical possibility 
would be a system of multiple patents for the same invention, although this would 
complicate licensing and reduce the value of patents. An intriguing option is the 
Japanese model: If there are two or more claimants, they jointly decide who is to 
receive the patent, but if they fail to agree, no one gets the patent. Tokkyohi'i [Patent 
Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 39(2), amended by Law No. 30 of 1990, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/ clealdocs_new/en/jp/jp006en.html. 
15. Published PTO statistics indicate that this is a rare event. See U.S. Pat. & 
Trademark Off., Patent Statistics Reports Available for Viewing, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2007). 
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system.16 When two applications claim the same invention, the right 
to the patent 17 is resolved by determining the first inventor in a 
proceeding in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO or Patent 
Office), known as an "interference." 18 The first patent statute 
conferred jurisdiction on the district courts to resolve competing 
claims of inventorship. 19 The modern administrative interference 
system was created in 1836, when the revised patent statute20 shifted 
the responsibility for resolving interfering claims to the 
Commissioner of Patents. 21 
Two consequences flow from the decision to adopt a first-to-
invent system: (1) if two parties claim the same invention, the patent 
is awarded to the first to reduce the invention to practice (not the first 
to reach the patent office with news of the event); and (2) even if 
there is only one claimant, a defendant in an infringement action may 
16. See Patent Act of 1790 §§ 1, 5, 1 Stat. 109, 109-110, 111; Patent Act of 1793 
§§ 3, 6, 1 Stat. 318, 321-22.; Patent Act of 1836 § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121 discussed in detail 
infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Under current law: 
In determining priority of invention under this subsection, there shall be 
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice 
of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to 
conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the 
other. 
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). The U.S. Patent Statute contains a process, governed by 35 
U.S.C. § 135(a), for determining first inventorship through an "interference" proceeding 
in cases of dispute. See infra notes 69-70 (discussing the "interference" process). An 
early article on harmonization argued that, in fact, the United States had a hybrid 
system, pointing to statutory provisions giving advantages to domestic inventors, so 
that patents could be denied to the first worldwide inventor. George E. Frost, The 
1967 Patent Law Debate: First-to-Invent vs. First-to-File, 1967 DUKE L. J. 923 (1967). 
Under the 1967 law, such a result could occur if the first invention was made outside 
the United States. The patent statute has since been amended to expand the areas in 
which inventive activity "counts" toward U.S. priority, putting inventors in any country 
belonging to the World Trade Organization on an equal footing with domestic 
inventors. 
17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(g). The first inventor must, of course, still comply 
with the requirements of the patent statute. Of particular importance to the first-to-
file debate, the first inventor must file an application within a year of the first public 
use, offer for sale, or publication describing the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
!d. 
18. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
19. Patent Act of 1790 § 5, 1 Stat. at 109. 
20. Patent Act of 1836 ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. at 117, 119. 
21. !d. § 8 at 120-21. 
(W)henever an application shall be made for a patent which, in the opinion of 
the Commissioner, would interfere with any other patent for which an 
application may be pending, or with any unexpired patent which shall have 
been granted, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner to give notice thereof to 
such applicants, or patentees, as the case may be; and if either shall be 
dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner on the question of priority of 
right or invention, on a hearing thereof, he may appeal from such decision. 
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invalidate the patent by showing that the patentee was not the first 
inventor. 22 It is possible for this to occur because the true first 
inventor may simply have chosen not to seek patent protection. In 
this case, no interference arises, and the patent will (unless the 
examiner finds a statutory bar) issue to the subsequent inventor. 
Other countries have first-to-file systems, awarding patents to 
the first applicant for a patent,23 even if there is a prior inventor who 
also files an application for a patent. In the past, patents were 
awarded to individuals who, while not inventors, were the first to 
bring an invention within national borders and even to individuals 
who simply were in favor with the government. 24 Some countries 
began as first-to-invent countries but switched to first-to-file 
countries.25 It should be noted, however, that the patent systems 
differ by country in significant respects, which make direct 
comparison of first-to-invent and first-to-file difficult. For example, 
the disclosure required in most first-to-file countries is less stringent 
than what is required in the United States to obtain a valid priority 
filing date. 26 In addition, one of the requirements of the U.S. system 
is the disclosure of what the inventor believes to be the ''best mode" of 
22. The Patent Act of 1790 provided for repeal of a patent if it could be shown 
that the patentee was not the first and true inventor. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 
109, § 5. The affirmative defense of lack of invention was first explicitly codified by the 
1793 Patent Act. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). The defense 
continued to exist in every subsequent revision of the statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). 
23. In the 1967 Senate hearings, Acting Undersecretary of Commerce 
Hollomon reported that only the United States and the Philippines were first-to-invent 
countries. Patent Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2, S.1042, S.l377 and S.l691 Before 
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1967). The Philippines has since amended its 
law to award patents to the first to file an application. The Law on Patents, Rep. Act 
No. 8293, § 29 (Phil.); Phil. Rules & Reg. on Inventions, Rule 304 (amended 1998) 
available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/fips_e/pdf/philippines_e/e_tizai_ 
kisoku.pdf. It would seem that for some reason the undersecretary excluded Canada, 
which was a first-to-invent country in 1967, but Canada has since become a first-to-file 
country. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4 (1988). 
24. See discussion supra note 10. 
25. Such countries include the Philippines and Canada. See supra note 23 and 
accompanying text. Neither country had a constitutional provision restricting the 
change. 
26. Frost, supra note 16; Samson Helfgott, "Differences Between U.S. and 
Japanese Patent Applications, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 1, 3 (1992). 
[T]he major part of a Japanese application contains marketing and sales 
promotion aspects of an invention. The actual detailed description of the 
invention itself is typically done in a very general manner [and] ... the detail of 
black boxes is generally left undescribed even though the specific contents may 
not be readily available on the market. 
Including ''black boxes" in an application would be unacceptable under U.S. practice 
(see 35 U.S. C. § 112) and obviously an application can be prepared much more quickly 
if it is not necessary to provide details. 
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carrying out the invention at the time the application is filed. 27 
There is no duty to update this disclosure during prosecution of the 
application. 28 Allowing an inventor additional time to perfect the 
invention should result in better disclosures and therefore greater 
contributions to the public domain. Finally, while the United States 
only grants patents when the claimed invention is novel29 and non-
obvious,30 not all countries examine patent applications carefully to 
make such determinations prior to issuing patents; 31 instead they 
often rely on pre-grant publication for opposition or post-grant 
litigation to resolve such issues.32 
The modern drive to harmonize international patent law began 
with the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property.33 The principal agency of harmonization in the intellectual 
property field is the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), an agency of the United Nations.34 
There is no doubt that areas of the international intellectual 
property system are in desperate need of harmonization. U.S. patent 
holders are unable to obtain adequate protection in many countries. 
The main areas of concern are outdated limits on the definition of 
patentable subject matter and respect for the private property rights 
created by a patent. In the United States, patents are broadly 
available for "anything made by man;" 35 patentability in other 
27. The patent application must "set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
28. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927-28 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
30. 35 u.s.c. § 103. 
31. In 1964, a U.S. Government Printing Office publication reported that 
France was only then starting to introduce pre-grant patentability searches and that 
Latin America and many other countries still had not done so. Invention and the 
Patent System, Joint Committee Print, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess., U.S. GPO 1964 at 13. 
32. Id. 
33. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 
25 Stat. 1372, 828 U.N.T.S. 30, revised by International Union for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, Dec. 14, 1900, 32 Stat. 1936, 189 Consol. T.S. 134; International 
Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, 213 
Consol. T.S. 405; International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, Nov. 6, 
1925, 100 Stat. 1789; International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
June 6, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748, 828 U.N.T.S. 10, International Union for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1; International Union for the Protection 
oflndustrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
34. WIPO was established July 14, 1967 as a "specialized agency" of the United 
Nations designed "(i) to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the 
world through cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in collaboration with 
any other international organization, (ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among 
the Unions." Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization 
art. 3, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Oct. 2 1979). 
35. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). Recent examples of 
patentable subject matter have included biotech inventions and business methods. See 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
454 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 40:445 
countries is limited or unavailable in many areas, including 
technologies in such important industries as software 36 and 
biotechnology. 37 As a result, competitors in these arenas may 
establish operations in many foreign countries and compete with U.S. 
innovators without cost. 
In the United States, a patent owner's rights are protected, even 
against the government.38 In many other countries, patent rights are, 
as a practical matter, unenforceable or subject to routine threats of 
nationalization.39 A patentee in the United States may (within the 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2105 (8th ed., 2nd rev. 2004); State Street Bank & 
Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed Cir. 1998), cert. den. 525 
U.S. 1093 (1999); Notification of Required and Optional Search Criteria for Computer 
Implemented Business Method Patent Applications in Class 705, 66 Fed. Reg. 30, 167 
(June 5, 2001). 
36. Software is not patentable under the European Patent Convention. Article 
52(2) of the European Patent Convention provides: ''The following . . . shall not be 
regarded as inventions ... c) schemes, rules, and methods for performing mental acts, 
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers .... " European Patent 
Convention art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199; see also European Patent 
Convention art. 53, quoted infra note 37; Hungarian Law on the Protection of 
Inventions by Patents, art. 1, 2(a), available at http://www.hpo.hu/English/ 
jogforras/shlaw.html?9533:1pC (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (noting that "discoveries, 
scientific theories, and mathematical methods" are not patentable); United Kingdom 
Patent Office, Requirements for Patent Protections, http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/p-
applying/p-should/p-should-requirements.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (noting that 
discoveries are not patentable); Phil. Rules and Regs. on Inventions 202(b) (methods of 
doing business are not patentable). 
37. European Patent Convention Article 53 provides: "European patents shall 
not be granted in respect of ... (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to 
microbiological processes or the products thereof." European Patent Convention art. 
52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199. The famed transgenic "Harvard oncomouse," 
patented in the United States in 1988 (U.S. Pat. 4, 736,866), was found unpatentable in 
Canada. Harvard College v. Canada (Comm'r of Patents), [2002) S.C. C. 76 (Can.). See 
generally Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New 
Technologies, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 523, 528 (2002); Donna M. Gitter, International 
Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1648-49 (2001); 
Michael Guntersdorfer, Software Patent Law: United States and Europe Compared, 
2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 6; Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents And Traditional Knowledge Of 
The Uses Of Plants: Is A Communal Patent Regime Part Of The Solution To The 
Scourge Of Bio Piracy?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 163, 181 n. 74 (2001). 
38. While injunctions are not available against the federal government, a 
patent owner is entitled to compensation for government use of patented technology. 
See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. The federal government also has the 
power to take patents, as it does any other property, provided the taking is for a public 
use and it pays adequate compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment. Id. To 
date, the most common reason for exercising this power is to preserve the secrecy of the 
contents of the patent for national security reasons. The procedure for preventing 
issuance of such a patent and determining compensation is set forth in 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 181-83 (2006) and in 37 C.F.R. 5.3-5.5 (2006). 
39. For example, Brazil routinely threatens to nationalize pharmaceutical 
patents: Hoffman-LaRoce's viracept in 2001, Merck's nelfinavir in 2003, Abbot's 
Kaletra in 2005. International Pharmaceutical Industry Weighs Issues of Patent 
Rights, Public Access, THE FOOD & DRUG LETTER, Nov. 21, 2003, § 688; Doug Bandow, 
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limits set by antitrust laws)40 choose whether and to whom to license 
patented technology; 41 the marketplace sets the price. In many 
foreign countries, a patent holder is required to "work" the patent to 
maintain it, is required to grant licenses to competitors, or is subject 
to nationalization of the patent without adequate compensation.42 
The area of harmonization on the top of the WIPO list, however, 
is not agreement on patentable subject matter or the enforceability of 
patent rights or compensation for patent owners when a government 
feels that a compelling national interest requires termination of the 
patent. The area of harmonization on the top of the list is agreement 
on whether the party entitled to a patent should be the inventor or 
the first party to file an application with a signatory patent office.43 
Some U.S. interests favor using negotiation of this issue as a 
bargaining chip for harmonizing the important areas of scope of 
patent protection and protection from nationalization without just 
compensation by U.S. standards.44 
Proposals for change go back at least to 1966, when the 
President's Commission on the Patent System, appointed by 
President Lyndon Johnson, recommended that the United States 
switch from its historical first-to-invent system to a first-to-file 
system. 45 Implementing legislation was submitted in 1967 46 but 
failed. 
Ploys from Brazil: South American Country Flouts U.S. Patent Laws, COPLEY NEWS 
SERV., June 28, 2005. 
40. See generally Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by 
Owners of Patents and Copyrights: Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox 
Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 1234-43 (2006). While substantially weakened by 
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 54 7 U.S. 28 (2006), patent misuse may be the basis 
for antitrust violations under Int'l Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
41. Cont'l Paper Bag v. E. Paper Bag, 210 U.S. 405, 405 (1908) (holding that it 
was not a defense to infringement that the patent was "a mere paper proposition which 
the complainant has never put into effect or use"). The current patent statute 
explicitly provides that the patentee's failure to grant a license is not a defense to 
infringement unless the patentee has market power in the relevant market. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(d). 
42. See articles cited supra note 39. 
43. Statistics indicate that in the United States, the issue arises in about 
0.05% of the applications filed. Patent Statistics Report, supra note 9. About 51% of 
those cases would be decided differently under first-to-file. Ian A. Calvert & Michael 
Sofocleous, Interference Statistics for Fiscal Years 1983 to 1985, 68 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 385, 390 (1986) (noting that priority was awarded to the junior 
party in whole or in part 48.8% of the time during fiscal years 1983-1985 when 
testimony was taken). 
44. Daniel Pruzin, Lead Report: PTO Chief Says U.S. Willing to Be Flexible On 
U.S. Rules to Secure Global Patent Treaty, PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 
DAILY, Mar. 27, 2002. 
45. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "TO PROMOTE THE 
PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 5 (1966). The 
report lists as its first recommendation that "when two or more persons separately 
apply for a patent on the same invention, the patent would issue to the one who is first 
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In 1987, the Clinton Administration indicated that it might be 
willing to change from first-to-invent to first-to-file in return for 
certain concessions from other countries,47 but it ultimately rejected 
the conversion.48 In 1990, the WIPO Committee of Experts on the 
Harmonization of Certain Provisions in Laws for the Protection of 
Inventions proposed a treaty requiring that signatories' laws provide 
that the patent for an "invention shall belong to the applicant with 
the earliest priority date." 49 When the treaty was debated, the 
Patent, Trademark and Copyright Journal reported: 
At the June 1990 meeting of the Committee of Experts, the delegation 
of the United States stated that for the United States to adopt the first· 
to-file system involved a fundamental change. There was no consensus 
in the United States that this change should be made. None of the 
interested associations had taken a position in favor of this change, and 
there were powerful, vocal elements which actively opposed it. 5° 
On January 24, 1994, the Commerce Department issued a press 
release stating that the United States would not seek to resume 
negotiations of a treaty harmonizing the world's patent laws at that 
time.51 In 2002, then-Patent Office Director Rogan indicated that a 
shift to first-to-invent was still open for discussion.52 The drive to 
move the United States from first-to-invent to first-to-file is again 
to file." Id. The commission concluded that the change would encourage prompt 
disclosure, eliminate interference proceedings, and harmonize U.S. practice with 
almost all other industrial nations. I d. at 6. 
46. Patent Reform Act of 1967, S.1042, 90th Cong. (1967); Patent Reform Act of 
1967, H.R. 5924, 90th Cong. (1967). 
47. Statement of Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Sec'y & Comm'r of Patents & 
Trademarks (Mar. 16, 1987), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/og/con/files/cons 
123.htm. 
48. William A. Beltz et. al., U.S. Says ''Not Now" on First-to-File and Agrees 
with Japan on Patent Term, 47 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 285, 285 (1994). 
49. WIPO Draft Treaty for Patent Harmonization, art. 9, § 2, Oct. 2, 2000, 
available at www.wipo.org/edocs/scp/en/scp_4/scp_4_3.pdf. The current draft of the 
treaty provides that the patent should be issued "where two or more applications are 
filed in respect of that invention, to the applicant whose application has the earliest 
filing date or, where priority is claimed, the earliest priority date .... " The priority 
date is the date when a patent application is first filed in a country signatory to the 
treaty. Id. at art. 2(ii). 
50. Edward G. Fiorito, WIPO Experts Make Progress on Patent Harmonization 
Draft, 41 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 231, 232-33 (1991). 
I d. 
51. Beltz et. al., supra note 48, at 285. 
52. Pruzin, supra note 44. 
Speaking to reporters in Geneva, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual 
Property and PTO director James Rogan declared that "everything ought to be 
on the table for discussion," including the controversy over the U.S. "first to 
invent" system versus the "first to file" system used elsewhere in the world 
which has stymied past efforts to draft a global patent treaty. 
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underway. 53 In analyzing the wisdom of this move, many 
commentators start with the proposition that "[t]he United States' 
first-to-invent system ... prevents true harmonization with the rest 
of the world." 54 While it is correct that the U.S. system is 
inconsistent with the rest of the world's, it would be equally correct to 
say that the rest of the world's first-to-file system prevents 
harmonization. The debate is not advanced by arguments over which 
of two inconsistent systems is "the inconsistent one," nor is there any 
principle of constitutional law which permits Congress to exceed its 
authority because "all the other countries are doing it." 
B. Early History and Overview of Current U.S. Patent Priority Law 
Patents are a special exception to the general prohibition of 
monopolies inherited from England. Early English patents were 
often political grants, unrelated to invention; "the most important 
ones were nothing but monopolies on well-known trades, granted to 
secure favors to some courtiers, to procure money for the Crown, or to 
assert a national economic policy against some local privileges." 55 
The English Statute of Monopolies restricted the grant of monopolies 
but allowed them to be granted to the first and true inventor of new 
manufactures for a term of fourteen years. 56 
In the United States, the Constitution gave Congress the power 
to grant exclusive rights to authors and inventors for limited times, 57 
and the first Congress responded, in its second session, with the first 
U.S. patent statute. 58 It gave the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
War, and the Attorney General (the "Commissioners for the 
53. On August 3, 2006, Senators Hatch and Leahy introduced the Patent 
Reform Act of 2006 which includes a shift to first-to-file. S.8831, 109th Cong. (2006); 
see also H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2006). 
54. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There 
Limits on the United States' Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 
(2004). 
55. Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 166, 
168 (1948). 
56. The Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, §VI, prohibited the grant 
of monopolies with the following exception: 
I d. 
any declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters-patent and 
grants of privilege, for the term of fourteen years or under hereafter to be 
made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures, 
within the realm, to be the true and first inventor and inventors of such 
manufactures, which others, at the time of making such letters-patents and 
grant, shall not use, so as also they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous 
to the state .... (emphasis added). 
57. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
58. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (repealed 1793). 
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Promotion of Useful Arts")59 the power to grant a patent for fourteen 
years to anyone who "hath ... invented or discovered any useful art, 
manufacture . . . or device, or any improvement therein not before 
known or used," and also provided for repeal of patent grants if it 
could be shown that "the patentee was not the first and true 
inventor."60 
The second patent statute, enacted in 1793, gave the Secretary of 
State the power to grant patents to any U.S. citizen who "invented 
any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement ... not known or used 
before the application .... "61 
Although the 1790 statute provided for repeal of issued patents 
and defenses to infringement if the patentee was not the first 
inventor, the 1793 statute made the first statutory provision for 
administrative resolution of multiple claims to the same invention: A 
three person board was appointed (one member by the Secretary of 
State and one member by each of the claimants) to decide entitlement 
to the patent. 62 The basis for the board's decision was a 
determination of the true and first invention.63 While the argument 
might be made that the lack of specific authority in the original 
statute to resolve multiple claims is inconsistent with a belief that the 
patent constitutionally belonged to the first inventor, it is more likely 
that, having established the principle, there was no perceived need to 
spend legislative time on an elaborate process, as only three patents 
were issued in 1790.64 The patent statute enacted in 1836 created 
the formal examination bureaucracy and an administrative procedure 
for determining the right to a patent among competing claimants. 65 
The current patent law remains a first-to-invent system: Only 
the first inventor may receive the patent for any given invention.66 If 
59. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1966). 
60. Patent Act of 1790; see supra note 22; infra notes 170-71. 
61. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318-23 (repealed 1832); see infra 
notes 172-75. 
62. Patent Act of 1793 § 9. 
63. WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS AND USEFUL INVENTION 211 
n.2 (1890). 
64. Thirty-three patents were issued in 1791, eleven in 1792, twenty in 1793, 
and twenty-two in 1794. The first year in which more than 100 patents were issued 
was 1808. In 2005 (the last year for which data is available), 143,806 patents were 
issued. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO 
THE PRESENT, available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/oeip/taffh_counts.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR). 
65. See infra note 179. 
66. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (2006). Others may apply for a patent under special 
circumstances, such as when the inventor is unavailable or refuses to honor a 
contractual commitment to sign the application. 35 U.S.C. § 118. Patents are personal 
property and therefore may be assigned. 35 U.S.C. § 261. Inventions made by 
corporate employees are frequently issued to the employer pursuant to an assignment 
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two or more applicants claim the same invention and are not 
precluded by a statutory bar,67 the U.S. Patent Office will determine 
which of the claimants is the first and true inventor through an 
interference. 68 Although the process may be expensive and time 
consuming, 69 the rules are simple: To be eligible for the patent, a 
claimant must have conceived of the invention and reduced it to 
practice, 70 either by making a working embodiment of the invention 
or by filing a patent application.71 The successful claimant is the one 
who was the first person to conceive72 of the invention unless that 
person is not diligent in reducing the invention to practice. 73 If the 
first conceiver was not diligent in reducing the invention to practice, 
that applicant forfeits the right to the patent, and the process 
under 35 U.S.C. § 152. Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee 
Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (1999). 
67. See discussion infra note 122. 
68. The interference process is provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), and the 
administrative rules are set out in Chapter 2300 of the Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure (MPEP). U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP (2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) 
[hereinafter MPEP]. 
69. An extreme example, U.S. Pat. 2,705,484 (Mechanism for Controlling the 
Starting and Operation of Internal Combustion Engines), was filed in 1932 and not 
issued until 1955. An interference was declared in 1935 and decided in 1939, followed 
by additional interferences declared in 1939 and 1944 and a suit to compel the 
Commissioner of Patents to issue the patent. Jorgensen v. Kingsland, 83 F. Supp. 319 
(D.D.C. 1949). Such extreme delays are not, however, unique to first-to-invent 
countries. It took Texas Instruments nearly thirty years to obtain the Japanese patent 
on the integrated circuit. Texas Instruments applied for the patent on February 6, 
1960, and received conditional approval in 1986, but Japanese companies filed 
objections which delayed issue until 1989. John Burgess, Japan Gives U.S. Firm 
Circuit Patent, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 22, 1989, at E2. 
After almost 30 years of consideration, Japan has granted Texas Instruments a 
patent on the integrated circuit, the basic invention of miniaturized circuitry 
that has made the computer age possible. Some American and Japanese 
analysts have contended that Japan delayed the patent for so long so it could 
nurture its own electronics industry .... 
The same article reports that a 1987 report of the U.S. Trade Representative alleged 
that patent applications generally took twice as long as in the United States. Id. 
70. Bedford v. Hunt, 3 Fed. Cas. 37 (C.C. Mass. 1817). 
71. If a patent application is enabling, it is a constructive reduction to practice, 
so the date of invention is the date of filing at the latest. Alexander Milburn. v. Davis-
Bournonville, 270 U.S. 390, 392 (1925); Innovative Scuba Concepts, Inc. v. Feder 
Indus., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1487, 1505 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 26 F.3d 
1112 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
72. Conception is the "formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and 
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied 
in practice." ROBINSON, supra note 63, at 532. 
73. 35 u.s.c. § 102(g) (2006). 
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continues until only one applicant remains. 74 The earliest applicant 
(referred to as the "senior party" to the interference) is presumed to 
be the first inventor, and subsequent applicants (referred to as 
"junior parties") must establish their earlier date of invention. 75 
C. Overview of Non-U.S. Patent Priority Law 
Although the United States rejected the approach, early 
European statutes rewarded the first person to bring a new 
technology into the country. 76 The first example of modern patent 
law is attributed to a statute of the Republic of Venice, enacted March 
19, 1474: 
[E]very person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this 
City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it 
to the office of our General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to 
perfection so that it can be used and operated. It being forbidden to 
every other person in our territories and towns to make any further 
device conforming with and similar to said one, without the consent and 
licence of the author, for a term of 10 years. 77 
This approach allows so-called "patents of importation," which do not 
require the applicant to be an inventor at all. Patents of importation 
are granted to anyone who brings new technology into the 
jurisdiction. Such an approach made more sense in a time when 
methods of communication were not advanced.78 It has been rejected 
by modern industrial patent systems. 79 
74. The required diligence need not begin until immediately prior to the 
conception by the second claimant. Scott v. Satoshi Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 1244-46 
(Fed. Cir. 2002). 
75. The first applicant enjoys a presumption that the claimed invention was 
completed as of the filing date and therefore has no need to prove an earlier date unless 
challenged. If the first applicant needs to prove a date of invention earlier than the 
filing date, the proof must be by clear and convincing, independent, third party, 
corroborating evidence. The inventor's testimony alone cannot meet the burden of 
proof. Maxwell v. K Mart Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1323, 1329 (D. Minn. 1995). If the junior 
application is filed more than three months after the senior application, the junior 
party faces additional evidentiary requirements. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b); MPEP, 
supra note 68, § 2308.01. If the effective filing date of the applicant is more than three 
months after the effective filing date of the patent, 37 C.F.R. 1.608(b) requires that the 
applicant must file (1) evidence, such as patents, publications and other documents, 
and one or more affidavits or declarations which demonstrate that applicant is prima 
facie entitled to a judgment relative to the patentee, and (2) an explanation stating 
with particularity the basis upon which the applicant is prima facie entitled to 
judgment. 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b). 
76. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
77. JOINT ECON. COMM., 88TH CONG., INVENTION AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 11 
(Comm. Print 1964). 
78. Patents of importation were allowed in seventeenth century England. See 
Edgebury v. Stephens, 17 Webst. Pat. Cases 35 (1691). 
[I]f the invention be new in England, a patent may be granted though the thing 
was practiced beyond sea before; for the statute speaks of new manufactures 
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The European Patent Convention80 is representative of modern 
first-to-file systems. Under Article 54: 
1. An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of 
the state of the art. 
2. The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made 
available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, 
or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent 
application. 81 
And under Article 60(2), "if two or more persons have made an 
invention independently of each other, the right to the European 
patent shall belong to the person whose European patent application 
has the earliest date of filing .... "82 
Similarly, Japan's Patent Act provides, in Article 39: 
1. Where two or more patent applications relating to the same 
invention are filed on different dates, only the first applicant may 
obtain a patent for the invention. 
2. Where two or more patent applications are filed on the same date, 
only one such applicant, agreed upon after mutual consultation among 
all the applicants, may obtain a patent for the invention. If no 
agreement is reached . . . none of the applicants shall obtain a 
patent .... 83 
As noted above, the United States is the only country in which the 
date of invention rather than the date of filing drives the 
determination of priority among claimants. If harmonization is 
desirable, and if the direction of harmonization should be determined 
by a head count of countries in each camp, then the norm is clearly 
first-to-file. 
ld. 
within this realm; so that if it is new here, it is within the statute; for the act 
intended to encourage new devices useful to the kingdom, and whether learned 
by travel or by study it is the same thing. 
79. Patents of importation were also rejected by the first Congress, although 
they still existed in England at the time: 
There is nothing whatever to indicate or suggest that in drafting the Clause the 
Framers intended it to encompass a narrower view of patentable novelty than 
that which existed in Great Britain. Yet the first Congress assumed this to be 
the case and refused to authorize patents of importation on the grounds that 
such were constitutionally precluded. 
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: the 
Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 49 (2002). 
80. European Pat. Off., Convention on the Grant of European Patents 
(European Patent Convention), Oct. 5 1973, available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/legal/epc/e/mal.html [hereinafter European Patent Convention]. 
81. Id. at art. 54, §§ (1)-(2). 
82. European Patent Convention, supra note 80, at art. 60, § (2). 
83. Tokkyohii [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 39. 
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D. The Economic and Political Arguments Regarding First-to-File 
While the number of applicants affected may be small, each time 
a switch to first-to-file has been proposed, the debate has been 
vigorous.84 Proponents focus on the first-to-file system's incentive for 
early filing, efficiency, and potential concessions that might be gained 
in return for the change,85 and opponents focus on the fairness and 
successful track record of the current system. 86 The political wisdom 
of a switch to first-to-file is beyond the scope of this Article, but it will 
be helpful to place the discussion in context by summarizing the 
policy arguments that have been advanced by others in support of 
each system. 
84. Each proposal has generated considerable scholarly debate over the wisdom 
and constitutionality of the proposed change. See, e.g., Donald W. Banner, Patent Law 
Harmonization, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 9 (1992) (former Patent Commissioner 
concluding that "harmonization would be an act of incalculable harm to the future of 
our nation"); Ned L. Conley, First-To-Invent: A Superior System For the United States, 
22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 779 (1991) (arguing that the United States should stay with its 
current first-to-invent system); Donald R. Dunner, First to File: Should Our 
Interference System be Abolished?, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 561, 566 (1986) 
(concluding that the United States should join the rest of world in adopting first-to-file 
system); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-To-File: Is American Adoption of the International 
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. AsS'N Q.J. 193, 234 
(1990) (concluding that United States should consider adopting the first-to-file system 
if favorable harmonization treaty is reached); Bernarr R. Pravel, Why the United States 
Should Adopt the First-To-File System For Patents, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797 (1991) 
(arguing that United States should adopt the first-to-file system); Gregory J. Wrenn, 
What Should Be our Priority-Protection for the First to File or the First to Invent?, 72 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 872, 891 (1990) (concluding that the United States 
stands to gain by adopting first-to-file, and "[a]rguments that the Constitution forbids 
such a change are tenable, but ultimately are not persuasive and should not prevent 
action by Congress"). 
85. See ABA Section of Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law, Proposed 
Resolution 102--{)7 (2005); Joint Hearing on S.2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the 
Subcomm. on Pat., Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary & the 
Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. & Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd 
Cong. (1992) (statement of American Intellectual Property Law Association that 
adoption of the first-to-file system would eliminate the need for interference 
proceedings); Pruzin, supra note 44. 
86. The Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit stated that "[m]any giant 
corporations have no need of a patent system .... [and] would be glad to compete on 
size, nationwide service, high volume, strong finance, and prompt delivery. They can 
kill off smaller competitors on any of those bases, unless the small competitor has a 
patent .... " Howard T. Markey, Some Patent Problems: Philosophical, Philological 
and Procedural, 80 F.R.D. 203, 210 (1978--79). Former Commissioner of Patents 
Banner likewise questions the motives and wisdom ofthe first-to-file system: "A strong 
attempt is being made to abandon the equitable U.S. patent system that has served us 
so well and replace it with a foreign type system which would aid the multinational 
corporations but mortally injure the individual inventor and small companies." 
Banner, supra note 84, at 12. ''The proposed sacrifice of the individual inventor on the 
alter of international patent harmonization would be an act of incalculable harm to the 
future of our nation." I d. at 16. 
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1. Arguments for Change 
Proponents of the proposed first-to-file system suggest a number 
of advantages. In 1990, the American Bar Association Section of 
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law favored the adoption of a 
first-to-file system, if only by a slight majority, noting that it would 
encourage prompt filing, reduce costs, speed the grant of patents by 
eliminating interferences, and promote harmonization. 87 The 
committee dismissed constitutional arguments, noting that existing 
law already denied patents to first inventors who had suppressed, 
abandoned, or concealed their invention. 88 
The strongest theoretical89 argument in favor of shifting to first-
to-file is that it is perceived as promoting early disclosure.90 Because 
an inventor has no way of knowing whether others are working on 
the same invention, the only safe course of action under first-to-file is 
to file a patent application as quickly as possible. The sooner an 
application is filed, the sooner it will become public and further the 
policy of encouraging dissemination of knowledge.91 
The strongest political argument in favor of shifting is 
harmonization with most other countries, 92 leading to improved 
87. ABA Section of Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law, supra note 85. 
88. The constitutional arguments are discussed at infra Part III.A-C. There is 
a distinction to be made between withdrawing one's entitlement to a patent for 
deliberately violating a policy and denying entitlement to one who complied with the 
policy. Where an inventor has suppressed the invention, there is not only forfeiture of 
the right to the patent but also no addition to the prior art; thus, a subsequent inventor 
who does make the required contribution to the public domain should not be barred by 
the suppressed invention. On the other hand, where there is no suppression and, in 
fact, the first inventor is in the process of placing the invention in the public domain, 
there is no policy justification for forfeiture to a second inventor. 
89. Theoretical arguments involve furthering a constitutional, as opposed to 
political, purpose. Article I, Section Eight can be read as favoring early disclosure as a 
means of furthering the progress of the useful arts by disseminating information. The 
current first-to-invent system provides incentives for early filing: The first inventor can 
lose the right to a patent if there has been a publication describing the invention 
anywhere in the world, in any language, more than a year before the application is 
filed. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2006). Since there is no way of knowing when such a 
publication might occur, the safest course, even under a first to invent system, is to file 
as promptly as possible. 
90. See Gregory J. Wrenn, What Should Be Our Priority: Protection for the 
First to File or the First to Invent?, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 872, 885 (1990) 
(remarking that the first to file system is consistent with, though not necessary to 
implement, an early disclosure policy). 
91. Proponents of the first-to-invent system raise the concern that first-to-file 
will dramatically increase the number of applications, overwhelm the Patent Office, 
and lead to delays in issuing patents. This would not, however, delay disseminating 
the information since applications are generally published approximately eighteen 
months after filing, even if the application is still pending. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b). 
92. Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: a Proposed 
Solution to the United States' First-to-file Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687, 702 
(1993) ("Proponents of first-to-file argue that it should be adopted because it is a much 
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predictability93 and, it is hoped, producing efficiency, lower costs of 
obtaining international protection, 94 and concessions on other issues 
of concern to U.S. interests. 95 Sean T. Carnathan notes the 
aspiration that, ''by bringing the U.S. system into harmonization with 
the rest of the world, the United States would also garner concessions 
from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) when 
negotiating other aspects of international intellectual property 
law .... The ultimate goal, the first-to-filers suggest, is a single 
world-wide patent application."96 The principal efficiency in the short 
run would be reduction of the time and expense spent in 
interferences97 and, some argue, reduced recordkeeping costs, even 
more efficient system and will enable the United States to participate in and benefit 
from the proposed patent law harmonization treaty."); see also Kim Taylor, Patent 
Harmonization Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The "First To File" Debate Continues, 20 
J. CONTEMP. L. 521, 534 (1994) (remarking that "the goal of harmonizing patent laws 
worldwide would be more closely met if the United States aligned itself with the first-
to-file procedure"). 
93. Macedo, supra note 84, at 216; Robert W. Pritchard, The Future Is Now-
The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291, 298 (1995) 
(arguing that evaluation of inventorship under the current system is uncertain because 
the "precise dates of conception and reduction to practice may be difficult to ascertain, 
even with detailed records"; the "quality of diligence each party exercised in reducing 
their conceived invention to practice is a subjective determination that lies with the 
trier of fact"; and the "amount of abandonment, suppression, or concealment sufficient 
to penalize an inventor is also subjective and is not defined in the statute"); Taylor, 
supra note 92, at 533. There is one important respect in which shifting to first-to-file 
might actually weaken patent protection. Currently, an alleged infringer can defend 
by showing that the claimed invention was known by others prior to the patentee's date 
of invention. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. In a first-to-file system, the 
analogous defense would be a showing that the claimed invention was known by others 
prior to the patentee's date of filing. Since by definition filing cannot precede 
invention, the result is weaker patent protection, greater uncertainty, and more 
litigation. 
94. DeBari, supra note 92, at 710 ("Additional advantages associated with the 
adoption of a harmonization treaty include the reduction of costs in obtaining patent 
protection internationally, reduction of costs associated with defending a patent, better 
enforcement of patent protection worldwide, and the simplification of international 
patent law"); see also Wrenn, supra note 90, at 879 (asserting that "harmony in the 
international patent practice would avoid cost involved with the dual patent anomaly 
that can occur is today's world"). 
95. Pruzin, supra note 44. 
96. Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed Re-Definition of 
''First-to-Invent," 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 794 (1998). 
97. Taylor believes the interference system can be eliminated by adopting first-
to-file. Taylor, supra note 92, at 532-33. This seems unlikely. Macedo observes that 
these cost savings would be limited, because: 
much of the procedural simplicity and cost savings to the applicants offered by 
a first-to-file system would be eliminated due to the two limitations currently 
being considered by WIPO, e.g., the derivation right, and the prior user 
right . . . . [A]n interference system would be necessary to determine if the 
applicant for a prior user right had commercially used the invention before the 
filing date of the patent which had been awarded. Therefore, in the end the 
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with respect to purely domestic applications.98 In the 1992 attempt 
to shift to first-to-file, the president of the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association (AIPLA) testified that adoption of a first-to-
file system would eliminate the need for interference proceedings.99 
This underestimates the ingenuity of skilled lawyers representing 
well-funded clients in high stakes contests.1oo Except in the highly 
theoretical case of two applicants submitting identically worded 
specifications, including identically worded claims, there will always 
be the possibility of testing, for example, whether the first filer has 
claimed the same invention and has enabled the invention.101 Even 
in that highly theoretical case, there will also be the possibility of 
testing whether the first filer has complied with the requirements to 
receive a filing date and has not violated some public policy, such as 
suppression of the invention or inequitable conduct.102 
The argument has also been made that harmonization to first-to-
file would reduce the likelihood that U.S. inventors would 
treaty is unlikely to provide any significant cost savings to applicants resulting 
from adoption of a first-to-file system. 
Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard 
in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 543, 571 (1988). 
Furthermore, as Carnathan points out, "even if the nation switched to a first-to-file 
system, the dates of conception and reduction to practice would remain relevant, 
absent further amendment to the system, in disputes over whether an invention was 
disclosed prior to the patent applicant's date of invention." Carnathan, supra note 96, 
at n.191; see also Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885. More conservative commentators 
assert that at least the change to first-to-file will reduce the cost and complexity of 
interferences. See, e.g., DeBari, supra note 92, at 709. 
98. Both Pritchard and Carnathan note that U.S. inventors are required to 
keep accurate records of all acts of invention in the event that a patent is involved in 
an interference proceeding and the inventor is required to prove conception, reduction 
to practice, and diligence. Pritchard, supra note 93, at 313; Carnathan, supra note 96, 
at 768. Most companies probably keep records for other reasons in addition to 
anticipation of interference proceedings. For example, such records might be kept in 
general to demonstrate independent discovery as a defense to possible trade secret 
misappropriation. If independent invention remains a defense to patent infringement, 
or if prior user rights are adopted, prudent companies will still keep detailed, time-
verified records of their activities. Companies in regulated industries, such as 
pharmaceuticals, have independent record-keeping requirements. It is thus unlikely 
that companies will abandon keeping careful records of their experiments simply 
because the patent system is changed to first-to-file. 
99. Joint Hearing on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978, supra note 85, at 93 ("If the 
United States adopts first-to-file, the question of right to a patent between interfering 
parties would be satisfied by a quick examination of filing dates, thus eliminating the 
need for interference proceedings."). 
100. See Macedo, supra note 97, at 572 ("The most likely result of adoption of 
the WIPO system would be a replacement of the current hypertechnicality with a new 
hypertechnicality ."). 
101. See, e.g., Amgen v. Chugai Pharm., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (deciding 
validity of competing patents regarding DNA sequences for encoding Erythropoietin 
(EPO)). 
102. 35 u.s.c. § 102(g) (2006). 
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inadvertently forfeit foreign patent rights by misunderstanding grace 
periods. 103 Under current law, a U.S. applicant has a year from 
public disclosure within which to file an application, 104 while that 
same delay would defeat patentability in most of the rest of the 
world. 105 To the extent that inadvertent loss of foreign rights by 
mistakenly believing that the rest of the world has the same grace 
period as the United States is a problem, the solution would seem to 
be harmonization of the grace period rather than harmonization of 
priority, a solution which would not present the serious constitutional 
doubts raised by the ftrst-to-ftle proposal. 
Proponents also argue that few will be affected by the change.106 
''More than 99.9% of the patent applications that are currently filed 
in the United States raise no dispute as to the identity of the inventor 
[and] these statistics clearly indicate that there would be no 
signiftcant difference in result between a ftrst-to-ftle system and a 
ftrst-to-invent system." 107 At least with respect to international 
corporations, the argument has been made that they already need to 
conform to the rest of the world's ftrst-to-file system and so would not 
change their procedures in response to a U.S. shift to ftrst-to-file.l08 
Optimistic proponents hope that switching to a ftrst-to-file 
system will only be the ftrst step toward a completely harmonized 
international patent system.109 While procedural harmonization is at 
least conceivable, the prospect of a single ftling resulting in a 
103. Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885. 
104. 35 u.s.c. § 102(d). 
105. See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 80, art. 52 available at 
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legallepc/e/ar52.html ("(1) European patents 
shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, 
which are new and which involve an inventive step."), Id. art. 54, available at 
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legallepc/e/ar54.html ("(1) An invention shall be 
considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art. (2) The state of the 
art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a 
written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the 
European patent application."). 
106. See, e.g., Macedo, supra note 97, at 568-69 (stating that "few of the people 
who file for patents actually declare interferences"). 
107. DeBari, supra note 92, at 707. These statistics only reflect declared 
interferences. Inventors are not required to supply their date of invention unless an 
interference is declared and contested. 
108. Pritchard, supra note 93, at 313. 
109. Macedo, supra note 97, at 581-82 (summarizing the advantages of 
harmonization, including reduced transaction costs of obtaining a patent, on the 
assumption that "[i]f the substantive and procedural rules were the same everywhere, 
only one set of arguments would need to be developed"; reduced costs of enforcing 
patents, on the assumption that "[i]f patent laws were harmonized, a judgment of 
validity in one country might be given either res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in 
other countries . . . [or] at least a strong presumption of validity"; and simpler 
international protection of patents resulting from fewer substantive and procedural 
rules); see also Carnathan, supra note 96, at 794 (remarking that the ultimate goal of 
first-to-filers is a single world-wide patent application). 
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universally enforceable patent is beyond reason. Countries differ on 
fundamentals other than procedure, such as patentable subject 
matter and standards of patentability. 
One commentator argues that the existence of the U.S. first-to-
invent system alongside first-to-file systems leads to the possibility 
that a licensee might need to license two patents to practice the same 
invention: the U.S. patent and the foreign patents.110 This, however, 
is a result not of the first-to-invent system, but of the existence of two 
systems. In fact, the problem would be resolved more completely if 
the world harmonized on a first-to-invent system (since there could 
only be one first inventor); in a first-to-file system, it would still be 
possible to have multiple patents on the same invention.111 
Two negatives of shifting to a first-to-file system should be noted. 
It would not be surprising to see a "race to the bottom," with 
applications being filed in those countries which make it easiest to get 
a filing date112 and at least some countries competing for the business 
by accommodating minimal filings. Presumably, the United States 
would still require a filing to be enabling, 113 so it would not be 
surprising to see a dramatic increase in challenges along those lines, 
placing an increased burden on the Patent Office or the courts. 
Moreover, if the United States retained the requirement that a filing 
must be enabling, it would place U.S. inventors at a great 
disadvantage with respect to their foreign competitors. Under U.S. 
law, a U.S. inventor must not file a patent application abroad without 
either obtaining a license to do so (a time consuming process) or first 
filing the application in the United States and waiting six months. 114 
Thus, U.S. citizens will be unable to take advantage of more relaxed 
filing requirements abroad, and the contest between two otherwise 
equal claimants will always go to the foreign applicant. The other 
110. Wrenn, supra note 90, at 872-73, 877. 
111. Consider the situation in which Inventor A files only in Country A, 
Inventor B files only in Country B, and so forth. In each country where the mere filing 
of an application abroad does not destroy novelty, a separate patent will be issued for 
the same invention and will be enforceable within the associated borders. Thus, one 
seeking to market the invention worldwide will require multiple licenses. If the patent 
were only available to the first inventor, there would at most be only one patentee 
worldwide. 
112. Current U.S. law requires U.S. inventors to file in the United States first, 
or to obtain a foreign filing license. 35 U.S.C. § 184 (2006). It is likely that there will 
be enormous pressure to relax this requirement to avoid placing U.S. inventors at a 
disadvantage with respect to inventors from other countries. One of the purposes of 
the requirement, though, is to give the government the opportunity to review 
technology for national security concerns and prevent filing abroad if doing so would 
jeopardize national security. Relaxing the requirement will therefore pose complicated 
tradeoffs between competitiveness and national security. 
113. In the United States, a patent application must be sufficiently detailed to 
enable one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
114. 35 u.s.c. § 184. 
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less quantifiable negative is the message such a move would send, 
incentivizing filing rather than invention. 
2. Arguments for the Status Quo 
The strongest theoretical argument in favor of the current first-
to-invent system is that fairness (and the U.S. Constitution) demand 
that the patent be awarded to the inventor, meaning the first to 
invent not the first to reach the patent office. 115 As discussed in 
detail at Part II infra, there are strong arguments that Article I, 
Section Eight requires that any patents be issued to the first inventor 
who complies with statutory application requirements and therefore 
prevents switching to a first-to-file system. Proponents also argue 
that a patent system should reward invention, not paperwork.116 
The strongest practical argument in favor of the status quo is 
that it conserves Patent Office resources compared to a first-to-file 
system, all other things being equal. Even if the quality of 
applications does not decline, a first-to-file system is expected to 
result in a significant increase in the number of applications which 
the PTO must examine.117 Unless other things change (for example, 
a return to the registration system of 1793), the available evidence 
indicates that quality will in fact decline and therefore make 
examination more difficult. 118 It is argued that under the current 
115. Banner, supra note 84, at 12 ("[A]ward to the first inventor is both logical 
and fair."); DeBari, supra note 92, at 702 ("Commentators and practitioners opposed to 
adopting a first-to-file system maintain that first-to-invent is an inherently fairer 
system because it rewards the original inventor and has served the United States well 
for over 150 years."); Macedo, supra note 97, at 576 (''The Anglo-American patent 
tradition, from the Cases on Monopolies to the present-day patent law, strongly 
suggests that it is the first inventor who is the more deserving."). Although Macedo 
notes that since the purpose of granting patents is to encourage the "Progress of 
Science and the Useful Arts" by granting limited monopolies in exchange for disclosure, 
"it may be just as reasonable to grant a patent to the first person to disclose an 
invention, as it would be to grant a patent to the first inventor .... " I d. at 577. 
116. Taylor, supra note 92, at 536 (stating the first-to-file system elevates 
"paperwork over true invention"). 
117. See Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885; Taylor, supra note 92, at 536. The theory 
is that inventors will respond by filing applications when the invention is first 
conceived in order to secure the earliest possible priority date, and they will continue to 
file additional applications as the invention is developed, rather than wait for a 
complete formulation of the preferred embodiment of the invention before filing. 
118. Macedo predicts that under a first-to-file system, the number of 
applications filed at the Patent Office would increase in quantity and decrease in 
quality, noting that over five times as many applications are filed in Japan (a first-to-
file country) than in the United States and that many of the 600,000 Japanese 
applications are scraps of papers written by the inventors and submitted for a priority 
date. Macedo, supra note 97, at 573; see also Helfgott, supra note 26, at 3. Critics of 
first-to-file also argue that such a system would foster premature and sketchy 
disclosures in hastily-filed patent applications, resulting in a decline in the quality of 
applications. This argument is based on the premise that to establish an early priority 
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system applicants may take the time necessary to prepare a complete, 
well-drafted application, without fear that by taking the time to do so 
they jeopardize ownership of the patent. 119 This argument is 
asserted to be of particular importance to less wealthy inventors, 
such as independent inventors and small companies. Under a first-
to-file system, those less wealthy inventors would be disadvantaged 
by the need to file multiple patent applications as their research 
proceeds,120 but under a first-to-invent system, they have the ability 
to delay the expense of patent application filing for a limited time121 
date, inventors will rush to file applications on the basis of bare concepts before the 
inventions are fully developed. Critics of the first-to-file system also contend that the 
Patent Office will be burdened with an increased volume of patent applications filed for 
defensive purposes, many of which will contain unpatentable and inoperable 
inventions. DeBari, supra note 92, at 704. 
119. DeBari, supra note 92, at 702-03. 
One of the leading arguments advanced by those opposed to adopting a first-to-
file priority system is that small entities would be placed at a disadvantage in 
the race to the Patent Office. This result would occur because of the limited 
resources available to small entities for preparing and filing patent 
applications. Under the first-to-invent system, once inventors conceive an 
invention, they can proceed diligently to reduce the invention to practice 
without rushing to file a patent application. Even if someone else files a patent 
application first, the first inventor will be entitled to the patent on the 
invention. 
Id.; see also Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885 (stating that "there are significant risks that 
result from over-encouraging early filing''). 
120. See MAURICE H. KLITZMANN, PATENT INTERFERENCE LAW AND PRAC. XXIV 
(1984) (noting that first-to-file would encourage a race to the patent office with "hasty 
application drafting with limited experimental exemplification or support"); Banner, 
supra note 84, at 9; Carnathan, supra note 96, at 796 (remarking that applicants may 
be "forced to file continuation-in-part applications in increased numbers" under a first-
to-file system); Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885 (noting a "comparative disadvantage for 
smaller organizations not as proficient at identifying and prosecuting patentable 
inventions"). But see 1987 Comm. Rep. A.B.A. Sec. Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. 62 
(Aug. 6-12, 1987), noting: 
Supposedly, first-to-invent practice allows the small inventor to reduce an 
invention to practice in a diligent, but measured fashion, consistent with 
limited resources, and maintain entitlement to a patent over an earlier-filed 
patent application of a more resourceful, subsequent inventor. This 
consideration, while theoretically and historically interesting, has little 
significance in almost every practical setting. 
This consideration has little practical significance because generally only well-financed 
corporate parties have the resources to engage in interferences. See also Macedo, 
supra note 97, at 578 (noting that advocates of the first-to-file system claim that very 
few small inventors benefit from the first-to-invent system due to the high cost of 
interferences). 
121. Inventors cannot wait indefinitely without risk because of other provisions 
of the patent statute, known as "statutory bars." Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 
(2006), even a first inventor can lose the right to a patent if anyone, even including the 
inventor, publishes an enabling description of the invention more than one year prior 
to the inventor's application. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 103(g), even a first inventor can 
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while perfecting their inventions. Therefore, unless the U.S. Patent 
Office hires significantly more examiners, the examination process 
(already longer than the Patent Office's own targets) must become 
longer or less reliable. A first-to-invent system also reduces the need 
for pre-filing secrecy, a problem of particular concern to academia, 
where the historical model has favored publication of scientific 
advances. Finally, defenders of first-to-invent argue that the current 
first-to-invent system has fueled economic competitiveness.122 
After reviewing the arguments for and against the first-to-invent 
and first-to-file systems, Macedo concludes "a comparison of the 
current patent system with the proposed WIPO model shows that 
neither system is so much better than its rival as to justify and 
outweigh the transaction costs of a change of systems."123 While the 
arguments in favor of switching are optimistic in their estimate of 
advantages of the first-to-file system and appear to overlook potential 
disadvantages, it cannot be said that it would be irrational to make 
the switch. The question remains: How? Must the Constitution be 
amended to accomplish the change, or is it possible to accommodate a 
first-to-file system under the current Constitution? 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM 
A. Article I, Section Eight: History and Interpretation 
Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eight of the Constitution, in 
what is variously referred to as the Copyright Clause, the Patent 
Clause, and the Intellectual Property Clause, confers on Congress the 
power "[t]o promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their ... Discoveries."124 
Especially given the ''broad strokes" approach of the framers, 125 
it is curious that specific power relating to intellectual property made 
lose the right to a patent by suppressing or concealing the invention. There are other, 
more complicated forfeiture provisions, for example forfeiture for unlicensed filing of an 
application abroad before filing in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 184. 
122. Taylor, supra note 92, at 528. 
123. Macedo, supra note 97, at 566. 
124. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
125. 
In the draught of a fundamental constitution, two things deserve attention: 1. 
To insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government should be 
clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought 
to be accommodated to times and events. 2. To use simple and precise 
language, and general propositions. 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 137 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (quoting 
Edmund Randolph). See also Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938) 
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it into the Constitution. Little is known about the genesis of the 
Intellectual Property Clause. James Madison commented that the 
"utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of 
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at 
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason 
to belong to the inventors."126 A contemporary essay indicates that 
the motivation may have been to encourage inventors and authors 
without tapping the meager resources of the new federal 
government. 127 Beyond that, most is speculation. 128 Some have 
speculated that the clause was included solely for the purpose of 
imposing limits on the power;129 others have attributed its inclusion 
to enlightenment interest in philosophy and natural rights. 130 
Written evidence of motivation and even of parentage is simply 
lacking. What little contemporary writing is available regarding the 
Intellectual Property Clause is summarized in Part II(A) below. 
Whether the clause sets the inner or outer limits of federal power 
with respect to patents is critical to harmonization. Two questions of 
interpretation arise: Does the Intellectual Property Clause authorize 
first-to-file, and if not, does it forbid first-to-file? If it authorizes first-
to-file, no further analysis is required; if it neither authorizes nor 
forbids it, the analysis must proceed to a search for another source of 
power. 131 If the Intellectual Property Clause forbids first-to-file, then 
either a coequal source of power must be found132 or the Constitution 
must be amended. 
(asserting that while interpreting the Constitution, it is presumed "that no word was 
unnecessarily used, or needlessly added"). 
126. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 279 (James Madison). 
127. Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 6 AMERICAN 
MUSEUM OR REPOSITORY OF ANCIENT AND MODERN FuGITIVE PIECES 303 (1789) ("As to 
those monopolies, which, by way of premiums, are granted for certain years to 
ingenious discoveries in countries, and more necessary in this, as the government has 
no resources to reward extraordinary merit."). 
128. See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science 
and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 31-34 (1994). 
I d. 
129. Id. at 32-33. 
The unusual fact that this particular detail exists in the Intellectual Property 
Clause in and of itself suggests a key to why such a clause was included. The 
Clause was intended not so much as an express authority to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts, but rather as a means of ensuring 
authority to do so in a particular way. 
130. See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
186 (1968). 
131. The Commerce Clause has been suggested as this alternate source. See 
infra note 195. 
132. The Treaty Power has been suggested as coequal with, and able to 
overcome, restrictions on legislative power. See infra notes 205-08. 
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Heald and Sherry133 identify six categories of historical evidence 
which the Supreme Court has used in constitutional analysis: pre-
constitutional history, 134 drafting debates, 135 ratification debates, 136 
public reactions, 137 early judicial precedent, 138 and early 
congressional precedent.139 
1. Pre-Constitutional History 
One of the sources of pre-constitutional authority is the common 
law of England at the time of the American Revolution. The English 
approach to monopolies was exemplified by the case of Darcy v. 
Allein 140 and the Statute of Monopolies. 141 In Darcy, the court 
invalidated a monopoly granted by Queen Elizabeth I on playing 
cards, holding monopolies generally illegal and detrimental because 
they raised prices, reduced the availability of goods, and reduced 
133. Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: 
the Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1119, 1141 (2000). 
134. According to Heald and Sherry, this includes English legal history, colonial 
practices, and state practices under the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 1130-31 
(citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 
455 U.S. 457 (1982)). 
135. Heald and Sherry again cite Alden and Railway Labor Executives'. 
Although, as Heald and Sherry note, 
[c]onsistent with the most sophisticated literature on original intent, however, 
the Court tends not to emphasize the drafters' debates. According to originalist 
theory, the legitimacy of judicial review depends on the Constitution's status as 
a popularly ratified document. Thus, the intent of particular drafters-mere 
proponents of ideas rather than enacters ... is not as important as how the 
words were popularly understood at the time. Remarks made by the drafters 
can illuminate this meaning but are not necessarily dispositive. 
Id. at 1132. But, the Court occasionally uses not only the debates of the drafters but 
also in one case a private letter James Madison wrote some 40 years later. See West 
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (citing an 1829 James 
Madison letter in support of the Dormant Commerce Clause). I d. at n.101. 
136. Alden, 527 U.S. 706; Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Monaco v. 
Miss., 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211(1995); Heald 
& Sherry, supra note 133, at 1134--35 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
137. Id. at 1135-36 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)). 
138. Id. at 1136 (citing Plaut, 514 U.S. 211). 
139. Early congressional precedents include the absence of congressional action 
as evidence that it believed it lacked constitutional authority to act. ld. at 1137 (citing 
Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) ("[I]f ... earlier Congresses avoided use of this 
highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought 
not to exist.")). Printz refers to the power to require state officials to assist in the 
implementation of federal laws. The case addressed the Brady Bill's requirement that 
local officials conduct background checks in the sale of firearms. 
140. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1083 (1973) (mentioning 
The Case of Monopolies (Darcy v. Allein), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 
1602)). 
141. Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.). 
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competition, although recognizing that one who ''by his own charge 
and industry, or by his own wit or invention doth bring any new trade 
into the realm whether by a truly new invention or by bringing to 
England a new trade or industry known elsewhere-might usefully 
receive a monopoly."142 In 1623, Parliament enacted the Statute of 
Monopolies, which codified the general common law prohibition on 
monopolies expressed in Darcy but also recognized the value of 
inventions and provided that the general prohibition: 
[n]ot extend to any letters patent and grants of privilege for the term of 
one and twenty years or under, heretofore made, of the sole working or 
making of any manner of new manufacture within this realm, to the 
first and true inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which 
others at the time of making such letter patent and grants did not use, 
so they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state.143 
Another source of pre-constitutional authority would be the laws 
of the colonies. Colonial patents appear to have been rarely 
granted144 and enforced even less frequently.l45 While most colonial 
patents were granted by special act of the legislature, at least one 
state, South Carolina, had a general patent statute.146 
2. The Drafting Debates, Ratification Debates, and Early Public 
Reactions 
The Intellectual Property Clause was adopted without debate 
and with little historical record.147 The patent language in particular 
appears to have been added in committee with no record of who made 
the addition or why.148 A number of explanations have been offered: 
142. The Case of Monopolies (Darcy v. Allein), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 
1260 (K.B. 1602). 
143. Statute of Monopolies of 1623. Note that the proposal to shift from a first-
to-invent system to a first-to-file system does nothing to reduce the "mischief' of 
monopolies; it merely shifts it from one monopolist to another. In fact, if the data are 
to be believed, the shift may well result in shifting the patent to a more powerful 
monopolist. 
144. Patents were, however, granted by the colonies and states prior to 1787. 
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557 n.13 (1973) (listing five such patents). 
145. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States 
Patent Law: Antecedents (5 Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 615, 623-31 
(1994). 
146. "[T]he Inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of 
making or vending their machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the same 
privileges and restrictions hereby granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books." 
An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, S.C. Public Laws 333-34 (1784). 
147. "No delegate to the Constitutional Convention has left any record 
concerning the interpretation or meaning placed on the intellectual property clause by 
the delegates themselves." Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early 
Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995). 
148. Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 51 ("There is no record to indicate how the 
intellectual property proposals submitted by Madison and Pinckney were transformed 
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(1) Support for the grant of patents and copyrights was 
so strong and universal that neither debate nor analysis 
was required. 149 
(2) Patents and copyrights were so unimportant that no 
one cared enough to debate or analyze the proposal.150 
(3) Patents and copyrights were non-controversial and 
the Convention had more important issues to resolve. 15 1 
The Intellectual Property Clause first appeared at the Constitutional 
Convention152 on August 18, 1787, when it was proposed to grant the 
federal government the power "To secure to literary authors their 
copy rights for a limited time; To encourage, by proper premiums and 
provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries; To 
grant patents for useful inventions; To secure to authors exclusive 
rights for a certain time . . .. "153 The proposal was referred to the 
Committee of Detaii.l54 On August 31, 1787, the proposal had not 
been acted on and was referred, along with other as yet unresolved 
into this clause. Madison, as a member of the responsible committee, must have 
known but never explained it. Nor did any other member of the Committee."). 
149. Sidney A. Diamond, Our Patent System .. . The Past is Prologue, 62 J. PAT. 
OFF. Soc'y 437, 440 (1980) (noting "[t]he delegates clearly believed firmly that it was 
in the public interest to establish a patent and copyright system .... Unfortunately, 
this lack of controversy and legislative history has provided later scholars with little 
guidance as to the framers' original intent."). 
150. Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 16 ("One indication of the relatively low 
value attached to patents is the fact that no record has been found of any litigation 
involving colonial patents of monopoly for invention in any colonial or English court."). 
151. Id. at 26 ("It may well have been that the delegates were tired, wanted to 
go home, and simply did not perceive this particular grant of power to the Congress to 
warrant any further debate."). Furthermore, 
The absence of debate over the patent provision ... has been taken as 
proof of their firm belief in patents as the best way to encourage socially 
beneficial innovation. However, it is more likely that the authors of the 
Constitution [acted] without paying much attention to the subject, since 
they were also faced with the larger problems of how to structure the 
government, solve its fiscal difficulties, and defend the new nation. 
Id. at 27 n.89 (quoting Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the 
American Patent System, 71 AM. SCI. 500, 500 (1983)). 
152. See id. at 43-50, for a detailed chronology of the development of the 
Intellectual Property Clause and the available historical record. Walterscheid notes 
inconsistent records of who proposed the clause, even among different accounts in 
Madison's notes. 
153. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 125, at 321-22; see also 
Kevin D. Galbraith, Forever on the Installment Plan? An Examination of the 
Constitutional History of the Copyright Clause and Whether the Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders' Intent, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1119, 1140 (2002). 
154. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
192-93 n. 7 (1967). 
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proposals, to the so-called Committee of Eleven.155 On September 5, 
1787, the Committee presented the Intellectual Property Clause in its 
current form, 156 and it was approved unanimously and without 
debate. 157 There does not appear to be any record of the 
transformation of the language in the interim. 
It has been asked why it was necessary to include an intellectual 
property clause at all158 when the philosophy of the Constitution was 
"to insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government 
should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and 
unalterable, which ought to be accommodated to times and events."159 
The power to protect intellectual property rights would appear, to 
modern eyes, inherent (e.g., necessary and proper under the 
Commerce Clause). One answer may be that it was not only not 
viewed as inherent in 1789, but it may have been thought to be a 
power denied the central government, in light of the Articles of 
Confederation's implicit reservation of the right to grant patents to 
the states and the lack of state laws protecting inventors. 160 It has, 
however, been argued that the purpose of including the clause and its 
unusual preamble was "not so much as an express authority to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, but rather as a 
155. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 125, at 473 (quoting 
Madison's journal entry of August 31, 1787). The Committee of Eleven comprised one 
member from each state except Rhode Island and New York, which did not have 
delegates present at the time. 
156. Galbraith, supra note 153, at 1140 ("On September 5, 1787 . . . the 
Committee of Eleven reported back with the following language: To promote the 
progress of Science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."). 
157. Id. at 1140-41. 
On September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement reported to the full 
Convention the entire Constitution, which contained the Copyright Clause with 
the language unchanged from the September 5 version. On September 17, the 
Constitution was adopted and signed by the delegates, and there was no 
recorded debate of the Copyright Clause. 
See also Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 26. 
158. Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 26. 
159. RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 125, at 137. Early on 
the Supreme Court held that "[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the 
constitution is intended to be without effect .... " Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
160. Article II of the Articles of Confederation specifically reserved to the states 
all rights not expressly granted to the United States. No right to grant patents or 
copyrights was included in Article IX. Some state constitutions explicitly prohibited 
the grant of monopolies. See, e.g., MD. CONST. OF 1776, Declaration of Rights § 39 
(1867) ("That monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government, and 
the principles of commerce; and ought not to be suffered."); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, A 
Declaration of Rights, art. XXIII (1868) ("That perpetuities and monopolies are 
contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be allowed."). 
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means of ensuring authority to do so in a particular way, namely, by 
securing exclusive rights for limited times." 161 
Walterscheid's exhaustive history of the Intellectual Property 
Clause identifies only one instance of discussion of the Intellectual 
Property Clause during ratification: "As to those monopolies, which, 
by way of premiums, are granted for certain years to ingenious 
discoveries in medicine, machines, and useful arts; they are common 
in all countries, and more necessary in this, as the government has no 
resources to reward extraordinary merit."162 
In the absence of any discussion or debate at the Constitutional 
Convention, it is logical to assume that the term inventor was 
intended to be interpreted in its ordinary, contemporary sense. The 
standard dictionary of the day would have been the contemporary 
Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language, which defined 
inventor as "a finder of something new."163 
3. Early Judicial Precedent 
The construction of the Constitution by the first act of 1790 and the 
act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its formation, 
many of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of 
itself entitled to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the 
rights thus established have not been disputed during a period of 
nearly a century, it is almost conclusive. 164 
With regard to the first-to-invent system of patent law, the period 
without dispute is, of course, now more than two centuries. 
Carnathan 165 argues, however, that the Constitution does not 
mandate the first-to-invent system, because 
[a]t the time of the framing, the term "first and true inventor" was 
unquestionably not understood to mean only the creator of the 
invention. On the contrary, "first and true inventor" as understood 
under the English Statute of Monopolies included a person who 
introduced to England an invention previously used in another 
country. 166 
161. Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 33. 
162. Id. at n.188 (citing Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal 
Constitution, supra note 127, at 303). 
163. A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1967). The definition is 
unchanged from the first edition (1755) through the fourth edition (1773), although the 
later edition deletes one example of usage from the first edition ("Th' invention all 
admir'd, and each how he To be the inventor miss'd. Milton."). 
164. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884) 
(construing copyright); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (early 
congressional indication that the president has sole power to remove executive officers 
supports the conclusion that the Constitution gives the president that power). 
165. Carnathan, supra note 96, at 772. 
166. Id. at 773. 
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Many members of the 1790 Congress had been delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention 167 and had rejected the English first-to-
introduce approach (as does the current U.K. statute).I68 This view 
also finds support in early cases.169 
4. Early Congressional Precedent 
The first patent statute was enacted in the second session of the 
first CongressP0 Section 1 authorized granting patents to anyone 
having "invented or discovered any useful art ... not before known or 
used . . .. " and Section 5 provided for repeal of patents granted to 
anyone other than the first and true inventor.I71 
The second patent statute, 172 enacted in 1793, provided, 
when any person ... being a citizen ... of the United States, shall 
allege that he ... [has] invented any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement of any art, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter, not known or used before the application, and shall present a 
petition to the Secretary of State, ... it shall and may be lawful for the 
said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made out .... 173 
167. See http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammemlhlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit 
(fr003443)) for a list of Convention delegates and http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/resources/pdf/chronlist.pdf for a list of Senators. 
168. The Patents Act of 1977 (as amended), 2007, 37 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf. 
169. The Pennsylvania Circuit Court rejected patents of importation in Reutgen 
v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556 (C.C.D. Pennsylvania 1804) (No. 11,710), charging a 
jury that "if the invention was brought over [from Europe], that is, if it appears that 
the plaintiff was not the original inventor, in reference to other parts of the world as 
well as America, he is not entitled to a patent."). Justice Story also rejected the 
English model in several cases. See Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
(No. 11,645); Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217); Woodcock 
v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491, 491 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No. 17,971) (stating "a subsequent 
inventor cannot, by obtaining a patent therefor, oust the first inventor of his 
right ... notwithstanding he may have been a subsequent inventor, without any 
knowledge of the prior existence of the machine .... "). 
It is sufficient, that he is the first inventor, to entitle him to a patent; and no 
subsequent inventor has a right to deprive him of the right to use his own prior 
invention .... [I]ndeed, this has been the habitual, if not invariable, 
interpretation of all our patent acts from the origin of the government. 
Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas at 437. 
170. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
171. ld. §§ 5, 7. Section 5 authorized an action for repeal of patent, and "if it 
shall appear that the patentee was not the first and true inventor ... judgment shall 
be rendered ... for the repeal of such patent .... " 
172. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793). 
173. ld. § 1. 
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It also required that the applicant "swear or affirm that he does verily 
believe, that he is the true inventor or discoverer of the art, machine, 
or improvement, for which he solicits a patent."174 
The 1793 statute made the first statutory provision for 
administratively resolving multiple claims to the same invention. A 
three person board comprised of one member appointed by the 
Secretary of State and one member appointed by each of the 
claimants decided entitlement to the patent.I75 The board's decision 
was based on a determination of the true and first inventor. 176 While 
the argument might be made that the lack of specific authority in the 
original statute to resolve multiple claims is inconsistent with a belief 
that the patent constitutionally belonged to the first inventor, it is 
more likely that, having established the principle, there was no 
perceived need to spend legislative time on an elaborate process: Only 
three patents were issued in 1790.177 The patent statute enacted in 
1836 created the formal examination bureaucracy and an 
administrative procedure for determining the right to a patent among 
competing claimants.178 The current patent law likewise provides for 
an examination of applications and award of patents only to the first 
inventor for any given invention.179 
With this background, we turn to the questions: Does the 
Intellectual Property Clause constrain patent enactments? Does it 
authorize first-to-file? If not, does it prohibit first-to-file? 
174. ld. § 3. 
175. Id. § 1. 
176. ROBINSON, supra note 63, at 211 n.2. 
177. PATENT ACTMTY CALENDAR, supra note 64. Thirty-three patents were 
issued in 1791, eleven in 1792, twenty in 1793 and twenty-two in 1794. ld. The first 
year in which more than 100 patents were issued was 1808. ld. In 2004, the last year 
for which data is available, 164,293 patents were issued. ld. 
178. Patent Act of 1836 ch. 357, §§ 7-8, 5 Stat. at 117, 119. 
ld. § 8. 
[W]henever an application shall be made for a patent which, in the 
opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere with any other patent for 
which an application may be pending, or with any unexpired patent 
which shall have been granted, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner 
to give notice thereof to such applicants, or patentees ... and if either 
shall be dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner on the 
question of priority of right or invention, on a hearing thereof, he may 
appeal from such decision. 
179. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text for The U.S. Patent Office's 
process for resolving multiple claims to the patent on the invention, known as 
interference. 
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B. Does Article I, Section 8 Constrain Patent Enactments? 
1. Is the Preamble a Limitation? 
Much has been made of the role of the preamble of the 
Intellectual Property Clause, specifically whether it limits Congress's 
power or whether it is simply eighteenth century "PR." In Graham v. 
John Deere, 180 the Court held that: 
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power 
stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the 
Congress "To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their ... Discoveries." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is both a grant of 
power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often 
exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English 
Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the "useful arts." It 
was written against the backdrop of the practices-eventually curtailed 
by the Statute of Monopolies-of the Crown in granting monopolies to 
court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been 
enjoyed by the public .... The Congress in the exercise of the patent 
power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose.181 
Likewise, in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 182 the Supreme 
Court viewed the preamble as a limitation on congressional power, 
holding that Congress cannot remove technology from the public 
domain, because doing so would thwart the constitutional mandate to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts. 183 Holbrook 
concludes that the preamble is limiting, although he characterizes the 
limitation as "slight."184 
180. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
181. Id. at 5-6. 
182. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
183. "[A]s this Court has held, in light of the limitations built into the clause, 
monopolies are not permitted under the Copyright Clause when there is no 
concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts."' I d. at 146. 
184. In summary, the preamble of the Patent and Copyright Clause does 
provide limitations on the power of Congress to act. The limitation, 
however, is slight and Congress has significant discretion in enacting 
laws to affect [sic] the goal of promoting progress of the sciences and 
useful arts. The other limitations of the clause, such as the limited 
times provisions and the requirement that Congress not remove 
anything from the public domain, contain significant restrictions on 
Congress' power. 
Holbrook, supra note 54, at 21. 
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2. Does Article I Limit Patents to the First-to-Invent? 
The specific question of the role of the preamble is, in fact, 
irrelevant to the issue of harmonization; first-to-file, first-to-invent, or 
patents of importation are all ways to further progress. Of greater 
consequence is the question of whether the Intellectual Property 
Clause limits patents to the first and true inventor. 
Although focusing on the question of whether a harmonization 
treaty might circumvent any constitutional limits on patent 
legislation, Holbrook suggests that absent a lawful treaty, 
inventorship is a limitation on Congress's power that would prevent 
conversion to a first-to-file system.l85 Citing the Court's observation 
in McClurg v. Kingsland186 that Congress's power to legislate with 
respect to patents is plenary, Macedo concludes that "[i]n view of the 
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Congress' powers to enact 
patent and copyright legislation, it appears that a first-to-file system 
with a derivation provision would likely survive a constitutional 
challenge by a disappointed patent applicant."187 
Congress's power, even if plenary, is of course still limited by the 
Constitution. In both Graham v. John Deere and Bonito Boats, the 
Supreme Court recognized such a limitation in general. 188 The 
Supreme Court has not addressed the first inventor limitation issue 
directly, but at least one circuit court case, decided after the Macedo 
article, recognizes this limitation explicitly with respect to the first 
inventor requirement.l89 
Thus, every factor identified by Heald and Sherry argues against 
the constitutionality of a first-to-file system under the Intellectual 
Property Clause. The pre-constitutional authority is sparse, but what 
185. Holbrook questions whether Congress could "under the auspices of a treaty, 
pass an intellectual property law that contravenes the limitations of the Patent Clause, 
such as affording a patent of infinite duration" but concludes that "[g)iven that 
historically the inventor has been viewed as first to create, then such tradition may 
suggest a constitutionally rooted requirement that would preclude a first to file system 
and thus thwart harmonization efforts." Id. at 1, 8. 
186. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202 (1843). "[T]he powers of Congress to 
legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as 
there are no restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their right to 
modify them at their pleasure." I d. at 206. 
187. Macedo, supra note 97, at 566. 
188. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141; Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 
u.s. 1 (1966). 
189. See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 444 F.2d 
406, 408 (4th Cir. 1971) (involving the consequence of failing to name all joint 
inventors, rather than a contest between competing claimants). The Fourth Circuit 
held that "Because Article I, § 8 of the Constitution authorizes an exclusive right in 
discoveries to inventors and none other, the law has been strictly construed to grant 
patents only to the true inventors." Id. at 408. 
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authority there is speaks of the rights of the first inventor.190 In the 
absence of any indication to the contrary, there is no basis to assume 
that the words used meant anything other than their ordinary 
meanings, and the contemporary dictionary definition of inventor was 
"a finder of something new." 191 The records of the constitutional 
drafting debates, the ratification debates, and public reaction are 
sparse. 192 Certainly the Framers were aware of the concepts of 
patents of importation and monopolies as favors and chose instead to 
seek approval for the power to grant exclusive rights to authors and 
inventors, not importers or people who had pleased the 
administration. Early judicial precedent, while interpreting statutes 
rather than deciding challenges to their constitutionality, rejected 
patent rights of claimants who were shown not to have been the first 
and true inventors. 193 Early statutes (and in fact every patent 
statute since the first Congress) granted patents only to the first-to-
invent.194 In short, there is no previously recognized constitutional 
basis for interpreting Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eight as 
enabling a first-to-file patent system in the United States. 
In other contexts, it might be argued that Congress should have 
the benefit of the constitutional doubt, since the Framers did not 
specifically say "and patents may not be granted to anyone else," or 
that the terms of the Intellectual Property Clause should be viewed in 
evolutionary terms and allowed to grow to match the demands of the 
international community. Here, however, the question is whether 
Congress should have the power to grant monopolies condemned in 
England by Darcy v. Allein and the Statute of Monopolies, odious 
under Maryland colonial law, contrary to the genius of a free state 
under South Carolina colonial law, and a power denied to the central 
government entirely under the Articles of Confederation. The 
evolution of the last 200 years has not improved the standing of 
monopolies. 
C. Can Congress Overcome Section Eight Limitations Through Other 
Clauses? 
Two solutions for avoiding Clause Eight have been suggested: 
action under the Commerce Clause and under the treaty power. The 
thrust of both approaches is that, even if the Intellectual Property 
Clause falls short of granting Congress the power to award patents 
190. For a discussion of The English Statute of Monopolies and the state 
statutes, see supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra notes 147-57 and accompanying text. 
193. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. 
482 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW !VOL. 40:445 
under a first-to-file system, it likewise falls short of forbidding it. The 
challenge, then, is to find an alternate source of the necessary power. 
1. Can the Commerce Clause Overcome Section Eight Limitations? 
Wrenn suggests the Commerce Clause as an alternate source of 
power to establish a first-to-file patent system, although only as a 
backup to the "unlikely event that the Patent Clause is held to limit 
'Inventors' to those who are the first to invent."195 The Trademark 
Cases held that the Intellectual Property Clause was not broad 
enough to provide Congress with the power to establish a federal 
trademark system since trademarks were neither inventions nor 
works of authorship.196 The argument that the requisite power was 
supplied by the Commerce Clause failed for two reasons. First, the 
Court found no expression of intent to act pursuant to Commerce 
Clause powers in the legislative history, and second, the legislation 
went beyond regulation of federal commerce (as the concept was 
understood at the time). 197 Subsequently, Congress crafted a 
constitutional federal trademark registration system under the 
Commerce Clause, limited to federal commerce.198 Thus, it is logical 
to look to the Commerce Clause to find power to create a patent 
system that is not authorized by the Intellectual Property Clause. 
Two main difficulties immediately emerge, one practical and one 
theoretical. Practically, the Commerce Clause only supplies the 
power to regulate federal commerce. For that reason, the Lanham 
Act only regulates interstate trademarks, leaving in place fifty 
intrastate trademark systems.199 Using this power would leave open 
the possibility of state patents. Given the concerns raised as to the 
possibility of two patentees (one first-to-invent, one first-to-file), 200 
the possibility of fifty-one patentees (one first-to-file plus one in each 
of the fifty states) would be horrifying. 
The theoretical problem is that, by holding the Intellectual 
Property Clause inapplicable to trademarks, the Court not only 
invalidated the 1879 federal trademark law, but also eliminated the 
question of whether the Intellectual Property Clause placed any 
limits on trademark enactments. The clause simply did not apply, 
195. Wrenn, supra note 90, at 890. "A modern analysis ... suggests that the 
U.S., on balance, stands to gain by embracing [first-to-file]. Arguments that the 
Constitution forbids such a change are tenable, but ultimately are not persuasive and 
should not prevent action by Congress." ld. at 891. 
196. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879). 
197. ld. at 97-98. 
198. Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (the Lanham Trademark Act). 
The current federal trademark law is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 1111-
29, 1141 (2006). 
199. See Trademark Act of 1946, supra note 198. 
200. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text. 
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and therefore could not limit Congress's power in the area. The 
Intellectual Property Clause does apply to patents, and therefore 
whatever restrictions it places on Congress's power must also apply. 
The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation .... The Congress 
in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints 
imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the 
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or 
social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize 
the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge 
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already 
available. 201 
Given the Court's interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause 
as a limitation on congressional authority (rather than a mere lack of 
sufficient authority), 202 the Commerce Clause cannot remove the 
limitation. 
2. Can the Treaty Power Overcome Section Eight Limitations? 
In 1879, the Supreme Court indirectly suggested using the treaty 
power to overcome Article I limitations, when in the Trademark 
Cases203 it left "untouched the whole question of the treaty-making 
power over trade-marks, and of the duty of Congress to pass any laws 
necessary to carry treaties into effect."204 
In the specific context of the first-to-file debate, Holbrook 
suggests that Congress, under the auspices of a treaty, might have 
power to enact an intellectual property law that contravenes the 
limitations of the Intellectual Property Clause, "such as affording a 
patent of infinite duration,"205 but concludes that, "under the current 
regime of nationally-based patent rights, the Patent Clause does limit 
the authority of Congress to harmonize U.S. law with international 
standards."206 More recently, Nguyen argues that the treaty power 
can be used to harmonize copyright laws beyond what would be 
permitted by the Intellectual Property Clause.207 In her view, while 
the clause is ''both a grant of power and a limitation," the limitations 
should be interpreted as "the outer limits of Congress' enumerated 
power" and thus "do not nse to the level of affirmative 
201. Graham v. John Deere Co. ofKan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
202. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. 
203. The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 82. 
204. Id. at 99. The Court, however, had explicitly held that trademarks were 
not covered by the Intellectual Property Clause and therefore not subject to its 
limitations either. Id. at 93-94. 
205. Holbrook, supra note 54, at 3. 
206. Id. at 4. 
207. See Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time? 
Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106 COL. L. REV 
1079 (2005). 
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prohibitions." 208 While distinctions might be argued between the 
nature of limitations with respect to copyrights and patents, early 
patent cases are consistent in their holdings that the Intellectual 
Property Clause limits congressional power and that the limitation of 
first inventorship prohibits contrary legislation.209 
The appeal of the treaty power solution is great as a practical 
matter. Finding a treaty unconstitutional is a statistically uphill 
battle: In 1952, Professor Sutherland could report "the Supreme 
Court has never actually held either a treaty or an executive 
agreement invalid." 210 The situation had not changed as of 1996, 
when Henkin reported, "No provision in any treaty has been held 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court," 211 and in 2001, when 
Bennison could still report that "in over one hundred years of ruling 
on the constitutionality of treaties the Supreme Court has 
maintained ... silence as to the proper scope of the treaty power."2l2 
Article II, Section Two of the Constitution grants the President 
the "Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur." 213 Article VI of the Constitution provides: "This 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land."214 The critical question is whether the Constitution, the 
laws, and the treaties are equally supreme or whether there is a 
hierarchy of supremacy and, specifically, whether the Constitution is 
"more supreme" than treaties. Although it would seem fundamental 
that, like a statute, a treaty must be constitutional,215 surprisingly 
there is at least one Supreme Court case that has been read as 
placing treaties on an equal footing with the Constitution.216 Nowak 
and Rotunda observe: "Justice Holmes suggested once [in Missouri v. 
Hollanclj that this clause meant that treaties were equal to the 
Constitution, even if they were not made in pursuance of it. As a 
208. Id. at 1114. 
209. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. While these cases involve 
statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation, they are indicative of the intent of 
the Founders. See id. 
210. Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARV. L. REV. 
1305, 1319 (1952). 
211. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 185 (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1996). 
212. Audrey I. Benison, International Criminal Tribunals: Is There a 
Substantive Limitation on the Treaty Power?, 37 STAN J. INT'L L. 75, 75 (2001). 
213. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
214. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
215. As early as 1870, the Supreme Court held that a treaty could not "change 
the Constitution, or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument." Cherokee 
Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 620 (1870). 
216. Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
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consequence the theory developed that treaties were not subject to 
any constitutional limitations" but conclude that "[t]his view is 
incorrect. As Justice Field stated, in often quoted dictum in De 
Geofroy v. Riggs, the treaty power, like all other powers that the 
Constitution grants, is subject to constitutionallimitations."217 
Missouri v. Holland, where Justice Holmes's suggestion appears, 
clearly establishes that a treaty may provide an independent source 
of congressional authority not explicitly granted by the 
Constitution.218 In 1913, Congress sought to protect migratory birds 
from U.S. hunters by enacting federal legislation. 219 In U.S. v 
Shauver, the legislation was held unconstitutional. 220 The United 
States and Great Britain then negotiated a treaty 221 to the same 
effect, and Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 in 
furtherance of the treaty. In Missouri v. Holland, 222 the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, noting that "acts of 
Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in 
pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so 
when made under the authority of the United States,"223 and "[i]f the 
treaty is valid, there can be no dispute about the validity of the 
[implementing] statute . . . as a necessary and proper means to 
execute the power of the government."224 The case, however, involved 
a treaty provision that was not prohibited by another clause of the 
Constitution, and therefore the issue whether the treaty was "valid" 
in a supremacy clause sense did not arise. 
Clearly, the Court could not have meant that treaties could 
sweep aside the Constitution. As Golove points out, "[t]he 
Constitution does provide some guarantees to the states that could 
not be withdrawn by a treaty." 225 It is unimaginable that the 
president and two thirds of the Senate could abrogate the freedom of 
217. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 242 (West 
Group, 6th ed., 2000) (citing De Deofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (citations 
omitted)). 
218. 
219. 
(1913). 
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433----34. 
The Appropriation Act for the Department of Agriculture, 37 Stat. 827, 842 
220. 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914). 
221. The Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit. Aug. 
16, 1916, T.S. No. 628. 
222. Holland, 252 U.S. at 416. 
223. ld. at 433. 
224. Id. at 432. 
225. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical 
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 
1083 (2000). "Nor could the federal government under the auspices of a treaty wipe 
away the guarantees of, for example the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth 
Amendment." Timothy Holbrook, The Treat Power and the Patent Clause: Are There 
Limits on the United States' Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 31 
n.176 (2004). 
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speech or religion or could repeal Article III simply by finding a treaty 
partner willing to lend its name to the act. The Court acknowledged 
that: 
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-
making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is 
obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the 
national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that 
a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be 
assumed that, in matters requiring national action, a power which 
must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government is 
not to be found. 226 
There is a line; the Court acknowledged its existence but left its 
location uncertain. The closest the Court has come to locating the 
line is the plurality opinion in Reid u. Covert, 227 holding that "no 
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or 
on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints 
of the Constitution."228 
Professors Heald and Sherry distinguish Holland from Reid by 
noting that Reid involved a treaty which conflicted with a 
constitutional provision, while Holland involved a treaty which went 
beyond what was provided for in the Constitution.229 In other words, 
the analysis is similar to the determination of whether an 
unexpressed power is "necessary and proper": lack of enumerated 
authority differs from limitation of authority. 
In the intellectual property area, lower courts have followed this 
line of analysis, although reaching conflicting results. Congress 
enacted an anti-bootlegging criminal statute 230 pursuant to the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) treaty. 
The statute proscribed the unauthorized recording or distribution of a 
live musical performance for commercial advantage or private 
financial gain. Congress believed the law was within its Intellectual 
Property Clause power, but the Intellectual Property Clause is 
limited to "writings." In United States u. Moghadam, a defendant 
was convicted under the statute. 231 The Eleventh Circuit held the 
statute could not be supported by the Intellectual Property Clause 
but, relying on the Trademark Cases, held that enacting the statute 
was within Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, 
because it was "not fundamentally inconsistent with the fixation 
226. Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. 
227. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding unconstitutional as violating 
rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments an executive agreement with Britain, 
which purported to give U.S. military courts exclusive jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen 
and their families stationed in Great Britain). 
228. Id. at 16 (plurality opinion). 
229. Heald & Sherry, supra note 133, at 1182. 
230. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(a) (2006). 
231. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. den. 529 U.S. 1036 (2000). 
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requirement of the Copyright Clause." 232 In its analysis of the 
question whether the Intellectual Property Clause imposed 
limitations as well as granted power, the Supreme Court noted a 
similar pattern in the Bankruptcy Clause. That clause had been 
analyzed by the Supreme Court in Railway Labor Executives' Ass 'n v. 
Gibbons, with the Court holding that the Bankruptcy Clause power to 
"establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" 
precluded enactment of non-uniform laws under the Commerce 
Clause. 233 The Eleventh Circuit assumed "arguendo, without 
deciding, that the Commerce Clause could not be used to avoid a 
limitation in the Copyright Clause if the particular use of the 
Commerce Clause ... were fundamentally inconsistent with the 
particular limitation in the Copyright Clause . . ."234 but concluded 
that "extending quasi-copyright protection to unfixed live musical 
performances is in no way inconsistent with the Copyright Clause, 
even if that Clause itself does not directly authorize such 
protection."235 
A New York district court reached the opposite conclusion on 
similar facts. In U.S. v. Martignon, the court dismissed an 
indictment under the same statute, holding it unconstitutional as 
violating two restrictions in the Intellectual Property Clause: 
granting protection for a work that had not been "fixed" (and was 
therefore not a "writing'') and avoiding the limited times 
requirement.236 "Congress may not sidestep the Copyright Clause's 
limitations through legislating under the Commerce Clause."237 
Professor Tribe concludes that a treaty "may effectively repeal 
preceding congressional legislation and preempt conflicting state 
law." 238 This falls short of placing treaties on a par with the 
Constitution or empowering a treaty to preempt constitutional 
restrictions. 
232. Id. at 1280. 
233. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 465. The Bankruptcy Clause grants Congress the 
power to "establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies ... " In Railway 
Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a law 
directed at a particular railway, concluding that bankruptcy legislation targeted at an 
individual carrier conflicted with the "uniformity" requirement of the Bankruptcy 
Clause and therefore could not be enacted under the Commerce Clause. "If we were to 
hold that Congress had the power to enact non-uniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the 
power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws." I d. at 469. 
234. Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281. 
235. Id. at 1280. 
236. 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
237. Id. at 426. 
238. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 4-4, at 645 (2000). 
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D. The Exclusivity Problem 
The suggestions to use the Commerce Clause or the Treaty 
Power are creative approaches to the search for alternate power. 
What these approaches miss, however, is that in order to convert to 
first-to-file, not only is the power to grant patents to the first filer 
necessary, but the power to deny patents to the first inventor is also 
necessary. Even if (1) the Intellectual Property Clause does not 
forbid grants of patents under other clauses and (2) either the 
Commerce Clause or the Treaty Power provides an independent 
source of authority to grant patents to first filers, there is one other 
provision of the Intellectual Property Clause which cannot be 
avoided: the "exclusive rights ... for limited times" provision. 
Finding an alternate source of power to grant patents, unconstrained 
by the inventorship requirement of the Intellectual Property Clause, 
only goes half way to what is needed to convert to a first-to-file 
system. In the absence of a way to deny the patent to the inventor, 
granting the patent to the first filer deprives the inventor of "the 
exclusive right" guaranteed by the Constitution and is therefore 
unconstitutional. 
E. The Constitutionality of First-to-File 
In summary, when there are two claimants to a U.S. patent on 
the same invention, the Constitution requires that the first inventor 
be granted the patent in preference to the first individual to file an 
application for the patent. 239 Harmonization, then cannot be 
achieved by simply revising the patent statute to change first-to-
invent to first-to-file. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS 
The goal of harmonization may, however, be achieved by other 
means if it is deemed worth the price. A constitutional requirement 
that U.S. patents be issued to the first inventor does not render it 
impossible to harmonize international patent laws. There are at least 
three possible solutions which are consistent with the U.S. 
Constitution: 
(1) Change the rest of the world's system to conform to 
the U.S. first-to-invent system. 
(2) Amend the Constitution. 
239. The first inventor must, of course, comply with the requirements of the 
Patent Statute in order to obtain a patent. 
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(3) Acknowledge the constitutional rights of inventors 
but acquire those rights. 
489 
While arguments might be made for each of these solutions,240 only 
the third appears to have any prospect for success. The first solution 
is purely a question of politics and power. No provision of the U.S. 
Constitution precludes harmonization by adoption of the U.S. system. 
The second solution is purely a question of politics. Amending Article 
I, Section Eight would not appear to require anything more than a 
supermajority of Congress and the state legislatures. However strong 
the arguments for harmonization, it is unlikely that they are strong 
enough to support that step. 
The third solution would retain the constitutionally required 
first-to-invent system but transfer the acknowledged rights of 
inventors where necessary for harmonization. This might be done by 
voluntary transfer. A patent is assignable personal property,241 and 
therefore, the first inventor may assign it voluntarily. Unfortunately, 
this solution would require the cooperation of private individuals, and 
there is no reason to believe that such cooperation would be 
universal. 
A. Eminent Domain and its Applicability to Patents 
Patents are property,242 and the classic solution to the problem 
of governmental need for personal property in the face of the owner's 
reluctance to part with the property is the exercise of eminent domain 
through condemnation. Eminent domain is an inherent power of 
government; 243 the federal government's exercise of that inherent 
240. The first solution might be justified on the basis of economic importance of 
the respective patent systems. While the United States stands alone as a first-to· 
invent country, its gross national product is nearly 40% of the total of all Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. (OECD statistics for 
2005 are available online at http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/default.aspx? 
DatasetCode=REFSERIES (last visited April 9, 2007). Thus, the argument for U.S. 
compliance with the majority view is not overwhelming. The second solution might be 
justified if the importance of patent harmonization ranks with religious freedom, free 
speech, and due process. At this point, there does not appear to be sufficient public 
sentiment to suggest that such an amendment could succeed. 
241. 35 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). This section permits the grant of a patent to an 
assignee. Thus, if condemnation were to take place during the application process 
(rather than after issue), the patent could be issued directly to the first filer. This 
would avoid some theoretical complications, such as bankruptcy of the first inventor. 
242. Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877) ("A patent for 
an invention is as much property as a patent for land."); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 
183, 197 (1857) ("For, by the laws of the United States, the rights of a party under a 
patent are his private property."). 
243. 
[I]n every political sovereign community there inheres necessarily the right and 
the duty of guarding its own existence, and of protecting and promoting the 
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power is limited by the Fifth Amendment. 244 Therefore, if it is 
concluded that the purpose is sufficiently important, the federal 
government can simply proceed, 245 consistent with the Fifth 
Amendment, to take all patents246 issued to first inventors who are 
not also first filers via eminent domain, paying the first inventors just 
compensation, and selling those patents to the associated first 
filers. 247 As a refinement which would conserve government 
resources, the system might incorporate the Japanese approach248 
(which allows the first inventor and first filer to negotiate ownership) 
and require government intervention through condemnation only if 
the parties fail to reach agreement. The result would be the same as 
interests and welfare of the community at large. This power and this duty are 
to be exerted not only in the highest acts of sovereignty, and in the external 
relations of governments; they reach and comprehend likewise the interior 
polity and relations of social life, which should be regulated with reference to 
the advantage of the whole society. This power, denominated the eminent 
domain of the state, is, as its name imports, paramount to all private rights 
vested under the government, and these last are, by necessary implication, held 
in subordination to this power, and must yield in every instance to its proper 
exercise. 
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 531-32 (1848). See also 1A-3 JULIUS L. 
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 3.01[1-2] (Matthew Bender & Company, 
Inc., 3rd ed. 2006) (1982). 
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property for public use, 
without the owner's consent, and upon making just compensation. This 
authority "springs from ... a necessity of government," and is considered to be 
an essential attribute of sovereignty. Eminent domain authority is predicated 
upon the superior right of the state over private property. It comes into being 
with the establishment of the government and continues as long as the 
government endures. Eminent domain authority does not require recognition 
by constitutional provision, but exists in absolute and unlimited form. 
(Footnotes omitted). 
244. The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken "for 
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend XV. 
245. In the constitutional sense, the mechanism of calculating compensation 
would involve the normal complications of establishing the value of a type of property 
which is, by definition, unique and speculative. If the technology is not unique, it is not 
patentable. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102. 
246. There are potential benefits to taking the patent applications rather than 
the issued patent, principally avoiding the risk of the inventor's bankruptcy, but also 
potential complications. Whether to take patents or applications would be a secondary 
issue to be resolved. 
247. To the objection that this does not benefit the first flier since, presumably, 
the price paid will be the actual value of the patent, the answer is that the purpose is 
to achieve harmonization without violating the U.S. Constitution, not to benefit the 
first filer; the same objection could be made to the system approved in Kelo v. City of 
New London. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
248. See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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if the United States had shifted to a first-to-file system and would 
therefore satisfy the demands of the treaty.249 
While condemnation is most often used to acquire real property, 
as early as 1848 the Supreme Court was faced· with the question 
whether eminent domain was limited to corporeal property and held 
that intangible property rights were also subject to condemnation. 250 
The power has since been used to take intangible property by 
federal251 and state252 governments alike.253 
249. Viewed from inside the system, several issues would need to be resolved. 
Should the first filer get the patent for free or reimburse the government for its costs? 
The treaty requires countries to treat domestic and foreign applicants the same, but it 
does not prohibit charging different fees for different categories of application. The 
United States already does so by providing a 50% discount on certain fees for certain 
categories of applicants. See infra note 306. Should the process be mandatory or only 
at the first filer's request? Should the first filer play any role in the condemnation 
proceeding, and if not, what should the sequence be? If the government first condemns 
the inventor's application but the first filer is unwilling to pay the same price, the 
government will have spent time and money and deprived the inventor of property 
needlessly. 
250. West River Bridge Comp. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848). Vermont's taking of a 
private toll bridge was argued to be a disguised taking of the owner's contractual right 
to collect tolls (granted by its charter from the state) and therefore a violation of the 
Constitutional prohibition of state interference with contracts. The Court held: 
[T]here can be no doubt ... that the charter of incorporation granted to the 
plaintiffs in 1793, with the rights and privileges it declared or implied, formed 
a contract between the plaintiffs and the State of Vermont, which the latter, 
under the inhibition in the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution, 
could have no power to impair. 
Id. at 530. However, the Court saw no basis for restricting the power of eminent 
domain to real (or tangible) property: 
A distinction has been attempted, in argument, between the power of a 
government to appropriate for public uses property which is corporeal ... and 
the like power in the government to resume or extinguish a franchise. The 
distinction thus attempted we regard as a refinement which has no foundation 
in reason .... We are aware of nothing peculiar to a franchise which can class 
it higher, or render it more sacred, than other property. 
Id. at 534. 
251. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006). 
252. States have, in effect, taken non-exclusive licenses under patents by the 
indirect route of asserting immunity from suit for patent infringement under the 
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. 
College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), discussed infra note 263. Note that the taking 
of a non-exclusive license may also deprive the patent owner of the ability to grant an 
exclusive license in the case where the owner had not previously granted any other 
licenses. 
253. Although quaere whether a state government could take a U.S. patent 
(rather than a non-exclusive license under the patent) through eminent domain. No 
such case appears to have been reported, and there are several arguments that might 
be made against the right of a state to condemn a federally granted, nationally 
effective, right: the state would be seizing property that existed beyond its borders; it 
would be interfering with a right granted by the federal government in furtherance of a 
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As early as 1881, the Supreme Court noted in dictum that 
patents were subject to eminent domain and that, although they were 
grants from the federal government, it was still necessary to pay 
compensation for taking a patent. 254 By statute, 255 the federal 
government is, in effect, entitled to a compulsory non-exclusive 
license to use any patent, subject to the patent owner's right of fair 
compensation. 256 The license extends to private entities acting on 
behalf of (or selling the patented invention to) the government.257 
national (not to mention constitutional) policy; and practical problems would be posed 
by the possibility of multiple states pursuing the same property. The issue is beyond 
the scope of this Article, and its resolution is not necessary to carry out the proposed 
solution to the patent harmonization problem. 
254. James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1882), 14 Otto 356 (1882) (Plaintiff sued 
the postmaster of New York individually, alleging infringement of a patent in 
furtherance of his official duties on a device for simultaneously canceling and 
postmarking stamps; the Court expressed concern over a suit against a public official 
individually but found the patent not infringed and therefore did not need to reach 
either the issue of jurisdiction or of taking without compensation in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.). 
255. 28 U.S. C. § 1498(a). 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United 
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of 
the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's 
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court 
of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation 
for such use and manufacture. 
ld. This statutory right to engage in what would otherwise be infringement of a patent 
has been held superior to an issued injunction against that specific act of infringement. 
W.L. Gore v. Garlock, 842 F.2d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Garlock had been enjoined from 
violating a Gore patent, but it petitioned for a modification of the injunction to allow it 
to bid on a government subcontract. The Federal Circuit noted that such a 
modification was unnecessary since the statute provided an exception to infringement 
if the activity were on behalf of the federal government; thus, use of the patented 
invention for government purposes would not be infringement and would not violate 
the injunction. 
The government has graciously consented, in the same statute, to be sued in 
the Claims Court for reasonable and entire compensation, for what would be 
infringement if by a private person .... In the event Garlock becomes a sub- or 
sub-sub-contractor, a gracious government has also taken care of that 
possibility in the second paragraph of Section 1498(a) which reads: "For the 
purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an invention described in 
and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a subcontractor, 
or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the 
authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or 
manufacture for the United States." 
To sum it all up, Section 1498(a) gives Garlock all that it asks for in its request to order 
the injunction modified and modification is therefore unnecessary. 
ld. at 1283. 
256. Calhoun v. U.S., 453 F.2d 1385 (Ct. Claims 1972). 
The theory underlying a patent suit in this court pursuant to that section is 
that the Government, when a patented device or invention is made or used by 
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The government also has the power to take an entire patent by 
eminent domain. The classic example of a situation in which the 
government would choose to take a patent rather than use the 
compulsory license provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is that of a patent, 
disclosure of which would threaten national security. The 
fundamental patent bargain involves the exchange of the inventor's 
agreement that a full disclosure of how to make and use the invention 
be made public258 for the government's grant of a limited monopoly of 
the use of the invention. Every application for patent is subjected to 
an initial review and, in cases where the publication of the disclosure 
would compromise national security, a special procedure is followed. 
It begins with the issuance of a secrecy order, which among other 
things, forbids filing the application abroad. 259 Examination of such 
an application is conducted in a special section of the Patent Office,260 
where the application is "examined for patentability as in other cases, 
but may not be passed to issue"; if it is determined that the claims of 
the application are patentable, a notice of allowability is issued,261 
but since the patent may not be published, it is not issued and 
therefore enforceable. Instead, the applicant's reward is a claim for 
compensation in the Court of Claims262 in lieu of a patent. Thus, 
there is precedent for awarding a patent applicant money instead of a 
patent where a compelling national interest so requires. 
States can, in effect, take non-exclusive licenses to practice 
patented inventions through sovereign immunity conferred by the 
Eleventh Amendment. 263 In Chew v. California, the Federal Circuit 
or for the United States, ipso facto takes by eminent domain a compulsory 
compensable license in the patent; the patentee obtains his Fifth Amendment 
just compensation for that taking through his action here under § 1498. 
Id. at 1391. See also Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U.S. 290, 305, 307, 308 (1912). 
257. Note that the statute displaces the normal federal eminent domain process 
and prescribes its own measure of damages. If the government initiates condemnation 
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491, then Pub. L. 91-646, § 304, 84 Stat. 
1894 authorizes reimbursement of "reasonable costs, disbursements and expenses, 
including reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees." If, instead, the 
government or its contractor simply proceeds to use the patented invention without a 
license, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) control. Calhoun, 453 F.2d 1385. 
258. 35 U.S.C. § 212 (2006). 
259. 37 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2007). 
260. This special section of the Patent Office is called ''TC Working Group 3640." 
MPEP, supra note 68, at 130. 
261. Id. 
262. Hornback v. United States, 91 F.3d 152 (9th Cir. 1996); Farrand Optical v. 
United States, 317 F.2d. 875 (2nd Cir. 1962). 
263. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held Congress's attempt to subject the states to 
liability for patent infringement unconstitutional because of a lack of evidence of a 
pattern of infringing conduct on the part of the States. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
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held that the Eleventh Amendment264 shielded states from liability 
for patent infringement because the patent statute, while creating 
broad liability for infringement, did not contain a specific statement 
of Congress's intent to abrogate state immunity and make states 
liable for infringement. 265 Responding to a perceived risk that states 
would use this shield to avoid liability for patent infringement and 
thereby violate the Fourteenth Amendment,266 Congress passed the 
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent 
Remedy Act), to "clarify that States, instrumentalities of States, and 
officers and employees of States acting in their official capacity, are 
subject to suit in Federal court by any person for infringement of 
patents and plant variety protections." 267 In Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the 
state made use of a patented process for managing funds. 268 The 
Supreme Court held "it is undisputed that Florida has not expressly 
consented to suit" and "Congress' intent to abrogate [state immunity 
from patent infringement suits] could not have been any clearer,"269 
but the statute was unconstitutional since Congress failed to use 
"proportionate" means270 in response to the perceived problem. 
264. The Eleventh Amendment provides: ''The Judicial Power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
265. 893 F.2d 331, 334 (1989). 
266. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "No State 
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. Furthermore, ''The Congress shall have power 
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. § 5. 
267. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 
102-560, pmbl, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-960, pt. 1, at 7, 33 
(1990); S. REP. No. 102-280, at 1, 5-6 (1992). Section 271 provides: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United 
States or imports into the .United States any patented invention during the 
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
Section 271(h), as amended, states: "As used in this section, the term 'whoever' 
includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a 
State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity," and Section 296(a) 
states: 
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a 
State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be 
immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal 
court by any person ... for infringement of a patent under section 271, or for 
any other violation under this title. 
268. 527 u.s. 627, 627 (1999). 
269. Id. at 635. 
270. Id. at 647. 
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While the Florida Prepaid case involved taking a non-exclusive 
license, states also have the power to take intellectual property rights 
in toto. For example, in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, the 
Supreme Court of California held it improper to grant summary 
judgment against the city's attempt to condemn a football franchise in 
order to prevent the team from leaving the city.271 The court found 
the power of eminent domain broad enough to cover the collection of 
intangible rights comprising a sports franchise. 272 
To date, both the non-exclusive license takings and the absolute 
takings have involved targeted takings for use by the government, 
where there is an identifiable government need for a specific patent. 
Clearing the constitutional barrier to harmonization would require 
taking patents with the intent that they be transferred to third 
parties and with the sole government purpose being simultaneous 
compliance with the Constitution and the treaty. 
B. The Challenges of Public Use and Just Compensation 
Two obstacles must be overcome, both posed by the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.273 The Fifth Amendment provides 
that private property shall not be taken "for public use, without just 
compensation." 274 The first obstacle is calculation of just 
compensation. Although by definition275 patents pose difficulties in 
finding comparable sales on which to base value, courts routinely 
value other unique properties (principally land) in condemnation 
proceedings. The second, and more difficult, obstacle is whether the 
The House Report acknowledged that "many states comply with patent law" 
and could provide only two examples of patent infringement suits against the 
States. See H. R. Rep., at 38. The Federal Circuit in its opinion identified only 
eight patent-infringement suits prosecuted against the States in the 110 years 
between 1880 and 1990. See 148 F.3d at 1353-1354. Testimony before the 
House Subcommittee in favor of the bill acknowledged that "states are willing 
and able to respect patent rights. The fact that there are so few reported cases 
involving patent infringement claims against states underlies the point." 
Id. at 640. The flaw in the Court's analysis is that, during the 110 years between 1880 
and 1990, the states were immune from liability for patent infringement. If anything, 
it is surprising that there were eight infringement suits prosecuted against the states. 
271. 646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982). 
272. Id. at 840. 
273. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003) 
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment requires that "the taking must be for a public 
use and just compensation must be paid to the owner"); Thompson v. Consol. Gas Util., 
300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) ("[O]ne person's property may not be taken for the benefit of 
another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation 
be paid."). 
274. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
275. A patent will not be issued unless the claimed invention is novel and non· 
obvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2006). 
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proposed system is "for public use," benefiting, as it will, private 
entities. The development of condemnation law, primarily with 
respect to takings of real estate for redevelopment purposes, indicates 
that the proposal would comfortably pass constitutional muster, 
particularly in light of the decision in Kelo v. New London. 276 
Purely private takings, even if compensated, are prohibited by 
the Takings Clause. "[I]t has long been accepted that the sovereign 
may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it 
to another private party B, even though A is paid just 
compensation."277 Early cases questioned whether it would be proper 
to condemn property to turn it over to another private party under 
any circumstances. Justice McLean, concurring in West River Bridge 
Company v. Dix, 278 opined that the government could not take the 
property of one individual to transfer it to another since eminent 
domain required a public purpose. 279 Modern cases, principally in the 
area of urban redevelopment, view the public purpose requirement of 
eminent domain broadly and permit the use of condemnation 
proceedings to acquire property to be transferred to a private party in 
furtherance of a governmental purpose. It is permissible to take 
property from one individual (paying, of course, just compensation) 
with the intention of transferring the property to another known 
276. 545 U.S. 469 (2005) rehearing denied, 545 U.S. 1158 (2005). 
277. Id. at 4 78 n.5 (paraphrasing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)). 
An act of the legislature ... contrary to the great first principles of the social 
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority .... A 
few instances will suffice to explain .... [A]law that takes property from A and 
gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a 
Legislature with such powers .... 
ld. Accord, Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, at 245 ("A purely private 
taking ... would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void."). 
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Neb., 164 U.S. 403, 416--17 (1896) (explaining that there must be a 
genuine public purpose for the taking; a mere pretext is not enough). 
278. 47 U.S. 507, 536 (1848) (Mclean, J., concurring). 
279. 
It is argued, that, if the State may take this bridge, it may transfer it to 
other individuals, under the same or a different charter. This the State 
cannot do. It would in effect be taking the property from A to convey it 
to B. The public purpose for which the power is exerted must be real, 
not pretended. If in the course of time the property, by a change of 
circumstances, should no longer be required for public use, it may be 
otherwise disposed of. But this is a case not likely to occur. The legality 
of the act depends upon the facts and circumstances under which it was 
done. If the use of land taken by the public for a highway should be 
abandoned, it would revert to the original proprietor and owner of the 
fee. 
Id. at 537-38. 
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individual, provided that the transfer is part of an overall plan which 
has a valid public purpose. 280 
The classic valid public purpose is economic redevelopment. 
Berman v. Parker involved condemnation of a department store 
located in a blighted area of Washington, D.C. as part of a plan for 
redevelopment of the area. 281 The store itself was not run down, and 
the owner refused to sell voluntarily. 282 The District initiated 
condemnation proceedings, and the owner challenged the taking.283 
The Court held that redevelopment was a valid public purpose, and 
successful development required taking all of the properties in the 
area.284 In Hawaii Housing v. Midkiff, land ownership in Hawaii was 
highly concentrated in the hands of a few landowners who leased 
(rather than sold) land to occupants. 285 "[T]he State and Federal 
Governments owned nearly 49% of the State's land, [and] another 
47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners .... [O]n 
Oahu ... , 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles."286 
Hawaii planned to reduce this concentration of land ownership by 
condemning land owned by large land owners and transferring it to 
the lessees. 287 The stated purpose was to reduce the "social and 
economic evils of a land oligopoly" that "created artificial deterrents 
to the normal functioning of the State's residential land market."288 
The Ninth Circuit held the plan "a naked attempt . . . to take the 
property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and 
benefit."289 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that 
it is "only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics" that matter; 
the acquisition of the property was in furtherance of a valid public 
280. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion places some limits on this power: 
"The determination that a rational-basis standard of review is appropriate does 
not ... alter the fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored 
private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by 
the Public Use Clause." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490. Justice Kennedy was satisfied with the 
trial court's evaluation and stated that "[t]he trial court concluded ... that benefiting 
Pfizer was not the 'primary motivation or effect of this development plan; instead, the 
primary motivation ... was to take advantage of Pfizer's presence."' Id. at 492. He 
cautioned, however, that "[a] court confronted with a plausible accusation of 
impermissible favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one 
and review the record to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that the 
government's actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose." Id. at 
491. 
281. 
282. 
283. 
284. 
285. 
286. 
287. 
288. 
289. 
(1984). 
348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954). 
I d. 
Id. at 28. 
Id. at 33, 36. 
467 u.s. 229 (1984). 
Id. at 232. 
Id. at 233. 
Id. at 241-42. 
Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 229 
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purpose, and a subsequent transfer to private parties does not violate 
the Constitution.290 It is of particular interest that the land taken by 
Hawaii was placed into private hands and presumably used for the 
same purpose after the taking as before it was taken from the lessor 
and given to the lessee. 
In Kelo u. New London, the Supreme Court again reviewed a 
taking of an individual's property for the purpose of transferring it to 
another individual and found the practice constitutional as a public 
use within the Takings Clause. 291 Kelo involved the efforts of the 
City Council of New London, Connecticut, to revitalize its Fort 
Trumbull area. The clearest factual summary is in Justice 
O'Connor's dissent: 
Petitioners are . . . owners of 15 homes in the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood of New London, Connecticut .... Pfizer ... announced 
that it would build a global research facility near the Fort Trumbull 
neighborhood. Two months later, New London's city council gave 
approval for the New London Development Corporation ... to prepare 
the development plan at issue .... [T]he NLDC generated an ambitious 
plan for redeveloping 90 acres of Fort Trumbull in order to 
"complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs, 
increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to and use of 
the city's waterfront and eventually 'build momentum' for the 
revitalization of the rest of the city."292 
While a portion of the area was slated for public uses, at least some 
parts of the condemned land were not planned to be opened to the 
general public. 293 The record before the Court contained "no 
allegation that any of these properties is blighted or otherwise in poor 
condition; rather, they were condemned only because they happen to 
be located in the development area."294 The city planned to transfer 
the condemned land to a private developer, but at the time it initiated 
condemnation, it had not chosen a particular private developer.295 As 
290. 467 U.S. at 244. 
291. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Technically, Kelo involved the constitutionality of 
state action and therefore was analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth 
Amendment having been held inapplicable to the states directly in Barron ex. Rel. 
Tiernan v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. 243 (1833). The transfer of patent rights from one 
individual to another would need to pass constitutional muster under the Fifth 
Amendment since patent rights are purely federal and the taking would be by the 
federal government. However, the analysis would be precisely the same: The taking 
involved in Kelo is tested using Fifth Amendment principles as applied to the state 
action through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472 n.1 (citing Chi. 
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)). 
292. Id. at 494-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari 5). 
293. Id. at 478 ("[T]his is not a case in which the City is planning to open the 
condemned land at least not in its entirety to use by the general public."). 
294. Id. at 475. 
295. Id. at 478 n.6. As the owner of an adjacent parcel, Pfizer was expected to 
benefit indirectly from the development which would result from the condemnation. 
The Court noted "Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often 
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viewed by the O'Connor dissent, the Kelo decision "holds that the 
sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private 
use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new 
use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the 
public .... "296 The majority held that New London's taking was part 
of a "carefully considered development plan."297 Acknowledging that 
the dispositive question was whether the city's plan served a "public 
purpose," the Court noted that "without exception, our cases have 
defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of 
deference to legislative judgments in this field."298 
While most of the development of eminent domain jurisprudence 
has taken place in the area of economic redevelopment, the Supreme 
Court has decided a condemnation case involving intellectual 
property. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. involved the EPA's use of one 
applicant's trade secret data to evaluate a competitor's applications 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.299 To 
obtain approval to sell a pesticide regulated under the act, companies 
are required to submit information concerning the product to the EPA 
for approval.3°0 Among the information required to be submitted is 
confidential information about the formulation of the product. 301 The 
EPA used Monsanto's confidential data to evaluate the application of 
a competitor, although Monsanto was compensated. 302 The 
government argued that making use of the data reduced barriers to 
entry to the pesticide market, thus increasing competition. 303 The 
Court found the objective sufficient to survive constitutional 
challenge. 304 
The application of the condemnation cases to patent 
harmonization is straightforward. Kelo allows systematic acquisition 
of private property with the intent that it be redistributed to other 
private parties (whose identities may be unknown at the time of the 
taking), provided it is part of a plan with public benefits. Kelo 
permits this even if that property is being used constructively and is 
of value to its present owner. The benefits do not need to be gained 
directly from the specific property that is taken, and it is not 
necessary that the public have access to the taken property. Great 
benefit individual private parties," and cited as examples the lessees in Midkiff and the 
competitors in Monsanto. Id. at 485. In each case, the incidental private benefit was 
necessary to promote the government's stated public interest. Id. at 485-86. 
296. ld. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
297. Id. at 469 (syllabus). 
298. Id. at 480 (majority opinion). 
299. 67 u.s. 986, 990 (1984). 
300. Id. at 990-91. 
301. ld. at 991. 
302. Id. at 998-1000. 
303. Id. at 1015. 
304. Id. at 1020. 
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deference is given to the legislature's judgment on this issue. There 
should be little doubt that patent harmonization is a valid public 
purpose since the Supreme Court has already held that international 
harmonization of intellectual property regimes is in the national 
interest. 305 Therefore, should Congress decide that those few first 
inventors who are not also first filers have property which must be 
taken to provide the greater public benefit of patent harmonization, it 
would not appear that the Supreme Court would second guess that 
decision. 
Details remain to be decided. Would the government absorb the 
cost of the takings or would it "resell" (as in Kelo) the taken patents to 
the first filers? Either approach would be consistent with Kelo. In 
the first case, it would be necessary to appropriate the necessary 
funds. Whether such appropriations would be wise depends on the 
true value of harmonization. In the second case, to avoid further 
Fifth Amendment complications it might be necessary to offer the 
first filer an option whether to ''buy" the patent application or not. 
Such an option system should still satisfy the requirements of WIPO, 
since it is similar to the interference system already in use in Japan. 
The patent would still be available to the first filer, and there would 
simply be a question of whether the first filer were willing to pay the 
price; the treaty is silent on the question of fees. Would the 
government take patent applications or only issued patents? Either 
approach would result in the patents being owned by the first filer. 
Would the government initiate and administer the process as 
principal, or would it instead facilitate negotiations between the 
competing applicants? There may be cases in which the first filer 
would voluntarily surrender the right to the patent. Since patents 
are assignable personal property, it would be permissible for the first 
filer to obtain the patent and sell it to the first inventor. 
Alternatively, assuming the United States does not abandon its 
current grace period policy, the first filer could simply withdraw the 
interfering application; the result would be that the patent would be 
granted to the first inventor. There does not seem to be any 
principled reason for going through the process for its own sake when 
the same result could be achieved by having the first filer waive the 
right to the patent. 
C. Reconciling Condemnation with Harmonization 
Condemnation provides a method for placing patents in the 
hands of the first-to-file. What remains is to determine if it also 
305. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195 n.2 (2003) (finding the Copyright 
Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. 302(a)-(c) (2006), constitutional). 
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satisfies the requirements of the proposed treaty. Several objections 
might be raised. 
From the public's perspective, it might be objected that the 
condemnation solution would be expensive. This objection goes only 
to the question of whether harmonization is worth the cost. In a 
sense, it is a test of whether harmonization is good public policy: A 
policy which seems good when costs are externalized may not appear 
sound when all of the true costs are considered. From the first filer's 
perspective, it may be objected that forcing first filers to buy the 
patent is inconsistent with harmonization. Nothing in the treaty or 
the Constitution requires that patent applicants receive their patents 
for free; in fact, patent offices charge fees, and the U.S. Patent Office 
fees depend on the nature of the applicant.306 In addition, there is a 
close precedent in the Japanese interference system. Under Article 
39(2) of the Japanese Patent Act, if there are two or more claimants 
to the same invention, they jointly decide who is to receive the patent. 
If they fail to agree, no one gets the patent. 307 Presumably, the 
parties make an economic evaluation, and the patentee compensates 
the other claimants. Thus, charging a premium for a first filer who is 
a later inventor could be justified. A final first filer's objection might 
be that the solution treats first filers differently than first inventors. 
In addition to the different treatment of different types of inventors, 
the patent statute already treats different types of inventions 
differently. There are, for example, different terms for utility and 
plant patents (which last from the date of issue until twenty years 
after the date of filing)308 and design patents (which last for fourteen 
years from date of issue). 309 
The first inventor might object that the proposal reduces the 
incentive to invent. Under the proposed condemnation system, the 
first inventor would still receive the constitutionally required 
incentive, although it would be the cash equivalent of the estimated 
value of the invention. The first inventor might further object that 
this is not equivalent to the constitutionally required exclusive right. 
The Constitution requires an exclusive right for a "limited term." In 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that Congress has 
extremely wide latitude in setting the term.310 If necessary, the first 
306. Small businesses, non-profit organizations, and individual inventors 
receive a 50% discount on many of the fees they pay. 35 U.S.C. 41(h) (2006); 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.27 (2007); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. FY 2007 FEE SCHEDULE, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/fees/fee2007february01.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). 
307. Tokkyoho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 39, no. 2. 
308. 5 u.s.c. § 154 (2006). 
309. Id. § 173. 
310. 537 U.S. 186, 194, 256-57 (2003) (holding constitutional an extension of a 
copyright term, which Justice Breyer demonstrated in dissent, was nearly unlimited 
from a discounted cash value perspective). 
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inventor could be given a short period of exclusivity, which would 
have little economic impact on the ultimate patentee. 
From the international perspective, condemnation may appear to 
offer technical harmonization without meeting the spirit of 
harmonization. It does, however, accomplish the stated objectives of 
the draft treaty, constrained as it is by the U.S. Constitution. If the 
draft treaty would not accommodate this system, one answer would 
be to rewrite the treaty, a potentially simpler task than amending the 
U.S. Constitution. If harmonization is of sufficient value, presumably 
this would be a reasonable price to request in exchange for changing 
200 years of consistent history. 
If the cost of the constitutionally sound solution is too high, one 
other route of harmonization remains: other countries could 
harmonize their laws to conform to the system that has produced the 
strongest technological engine in the world. 
